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Abstract
Machine Learning Based Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in
Wide Area Monitoring Systems
Christian Salem
The Smart Grid (SG) is an upgraded, intelligent, and a more reliable version of the tradi-
tional Power Grid due to the integration of information and communication technologies.
The operation of the SG requires a dense communication network to link all its compo-
nents. But such a network renders it prone to cyber attacks jeopardizing the integrity and
security of the communicated data between the physical electric grid and the control cen-
ters. One of the most prominent components of the SG are Wide Area Monitoring Systems
(WAMS). WAMS are a modern platform for grid-wide information, communication, and
coordination that play a major role in maintaining the stability of the grid against major dis-
turbances. In this thesis, an anomaly detection framework is proposed to identify False Data
Injection (FDI) attacks in WAMS using different Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learn-
ing (DL) techniques, i.e., Deep Autoencoders (DAE), Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM),
and One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM). These algorithms leverage diverse,
complex, and high-volume power measurements coming from communications between
different components of the grid to detect intelligent FDI attacks. The injected false data is
assumed to target several major WAMS monitoring applications, such as Voltage Stability
Monitoring (VSM), and Phase Angle Monitoring (PAM). The attack vector is considered
to be smartly crafted based on the power system data, so that it can pass the conventional
bad data detection schemes and remain stealthy. Due to the lack of realistic attack data,
machine learning-based anomaly detection techniques are used to detect FDI attacks. To
demonstrate the impact of attacks on the realistic WAMS traffic and to show the effective-
ness of the proposed detection framework, a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) co-simulation
testbed is developed. The performance of the implemented techniques is compared on the
testbed data using different metrics: Accuracy, F1 score, and False Positive Rate (FPR)
and False Negative Rate (FNR). The IEEE 9-bus and IEEE 39-bus systems are used as
benchmarks to investigate the framework scalability. The experimental results prove the
effectiveness of the proposed models in detecting FDI attacks in WAMS.
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Energy infrastructures, in particular power systems, are one of the major critical infras-
tructures in a modern society [2]. The power system ensures the generation and distribu-
tion of electric energy among the consumers. Such a large-scale energy delivery system
is comprised of 3 main subsystems, namely, generation, transmission, and distribution.
The coordinated operation of these systems ensures the uninterrupted and stable produc-
tion, delivery, and consumption of electricity. However, the generation and transmission
systems can experience various types of instabilities and operational issues due to natural
causes and electrical malfunctions [3]. Consequently, analyzing the stability and operation
of transmission and generation systems is of paramount importance since these systems
cover large geographic areas that can span thousands of kilometers. As a result, any issue
in the operation of these systems may affect a huge number of consumers or even cause
blackouts. Therefore, the use of a monitoring and data acquisition system is necessary to
improve the operation of the system. In power system, the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system is traditionally used for monitoring purposes. However, it
suffers from various limitations, such as very limited communication infrastructure, and
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low data sampling rates. Recently, in order to improve efficiency and reliability of the
power system, the smart grid concept is introduced. The majority of the advantages of
deploying the smart grid concept are the result of the integration of distributed renewable
energy generation systems and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) into
the conventional electric grid. As a result, power systems start to increasingly employ
significant amount of communication technologies and cyber devices [4]. WAMS benefit
from this cyber and communication layer to tackle the drawbacks of conventional SCADA
system [5]. This system is one of the major smart grid domains that monitors the grid op-
eration and provides real-time, highly-sampled, and time-synchronized data for the control
and protection layers of the power grid [6]. WAMS is composed of physical and cyber lay-
ers. The former comprises generators, buses and transmission lines of the grid, while the
latter encompasses the Phasor Measurement Units (PMU), the Phasor Data Concentrators
(PDC) and the communication links that connect them to the system operator. The design
of WAMS requires an extremely dense communication network and extensive deployment
of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), which renders it prone to cyberattacks [7]. These
attacks can have catastrophic consequences such as cascading failures and blackouts over
large areas. Recent events demonstrate the susceptibility of the cyber layer of smart grid
systems to cyber attacks, such as the Ukraine cyberattack [8]. It is worth mentioning that
various types of malware have been used to launch such attacks, e.g., BlackEnergy [9],
Industroyer [10], Duqu [11], Stuxnet [12]. One dangerous class of attacks is stealthy False
Data Inspection (FDI) attacks. FDI attacks manipulate the collected physical measurements
in order to mislead the decision-making process of the WAMS operator. Such attacks can
have grave consequences such as line overloads that can lead to large-scale blackouts [13].
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a suitable approach to examine the communicated mea-




The purpose of this research is to design, implement, and evaluate a new platform for
WAMS security monitoring that utilizes DPI and ML-based anomaly detection methods in
order to identify stealthy FDI attacks.
1.3 Objectives
The objectives of this research are as follows:
• To assess the benefits of employing ML as a solution for WAMS security monitoring
with a focus on leveraging DPI-extracted features by anomaly detection models to
enhance the threat detection in WAMS.
• Develop a realistic WAMS cyber-physical testbed that integrates hardware, different
scenarios and WAMS-specific monitoring indices for evaluation of proposed ML-
based approach.
• Design and implement a real-time WAMS monitoring platform based on DPI and
ML anomaly detection to monitor and protect WAMS operations.
• Elaborate and compare multiple anomaly detection methods and evaluate their scal-
ability and effectiveness in attack identification.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this research are:
1. An investigation on the validity and effectiveness of DPI and ML for WAMS security
monitoring with a focus 2 WAMS-specific protocols IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-
90-5.
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2. A real-time, realistic, HIL WAMS co-simulation model is elaborated. The model
incorporates commercial hardware and takes into account different operational sce-
narios, applications, and system sizes.
3. A set of FDI attack scenarios is developed and implemented. The attacks are tai-
lored for WAMS-specific application in order to prompt erroneous behavior from the
control center.
4. An anomaly detection approach to the FDI attack problem is developed in order to
align the solution with the real-world operation of the smart grid where normal data
is abundant but attack data is scarce.
5. The performance and scalability of different anomaly detection techniques in identi-
fying FDI attacks in WAMS are evaluated and compared.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis if organized as follows. Chapter 2 of this thesis presents
background information and concepts on WAMS, its communication infrastructure, threat
models, and DPI. Chapter 3 provides a literature review on WAMS, FDI attacks targeting
them, and solutions against these threats. Chapter 4 describes the design of the proposed
DPI platform and details the different anomaly detection models developed. It also presents
the methodology that can be used to craft and launch the studied cyberattacks. Chapter 5
details the WAMS testbed architecture and its communications. Moreover, it details the
attack scenarios implemented and launched against the WAMS applications. Furthermore,
it presents the experimental results on the effectiveness of the proposed DPI platform at
detecting the attacks. Chapter 6 draws the conclusions and discusses the implications and




This chapter provides an overview of the concepts discussed in this research. First, legacy
SCADA systems are introduced. Second, the concepts related to WAMS are discussed
covering WAMS communication networks, protocols, and applications. Third, cyberattack
threats that can impact WAMS are presented. Fourth, the potential of DPI is explained with
respect to the proposed cybersecurity approach. Finally, anomaly detection is detailed.
2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
SCADA systems are widely-used automation control systems in many industries, including
power, water, oil and gas, among others [14]. Although IEDs are replacing legacy sensors
and actuators in SCADA systems, the incumbent SCADA systems will still provide a ma-
jority of monitoring and control capabilities to the smart grid in the near future, before
being eventually upgraded to or replaced by the WAMS [15].
An overview of the SCADA architecture is shown in Fig. 1 (adapted from [16]). In gen-
eral, SCADA encompasses two principal activities, the monitoring of processes and equip-
ment as well as the corresponding supervisory control, carried out by four components: the
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), the communication systems, the Master Terminal Units
5
Figure 1: SCADA Network Architecture
(MTUs), and the Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The RTU acquires analogue measure-
ments from field sensors and converts them into digital signals to be sent to the MTU; it also
converts control commands received from the MTU to control actions executable by the ac-
tuators. The measurements and commands are exchanged as packet payloads through the
proprietary communication protocols between RTUs in the field and MTUs at the control
centers. A MTU collects and monitors the state of the grid with measurements received
from the RTUs and determines proper commands to be sent back through the feedback
control loop. An HMI allows SCADA operators to interact with the MTU and manage
the entire system [15]. Historians may also be deployed along with the MTU and HMI to
archive the measurements and event logs for further auditing and analysis.
In the smart grid, SCADA systems provide non-synchronous information of the system
at lower data sampling rates, normally less than one sample per second. Subsequently,
the control center is required to re-align the various measurements arriving at different
times within a certain time window - which can vary from 2 to 15 seconds depending on
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system configuration - and further down-sample the data. The lower sampling rate and re-
alignment thereby provides a low resolution view of the system compared to WAMS, with
benefit in terms of bandwidth requirement and energy consumption. Also, many legacy
SCADA systems were initially designed before the 2000s. As such, these systems do not
provide native or adequate support for security features like encryption. Recently, with the
increased adoption of PMUs, some studies have explored their integration into SCADA
systems in order to enhance the monitoring performance [17]. SCADA systems don’t usu-
ally rely on PMUs, however, with the introduction of PMUs to SCADA, we notice a step
towards the transition from legacy SCADA systems which are still more widely used to-
day, to novel real-time WAMS systems. It is important to note that SCADA and WAMS
are complimentary since they both serve the same purpose of monitoring the transmission
system and protecting it against faults and disturbances.
2.2 Wide Area Monitoring Systems
This section discusses concepts related to WAMS. It is broken down into four parts. The
first part explains the role that WAMS play in the SG. The second discusses the WAMS
digital communication system. The third part describes the WAMS protocols used in the
communication. The final part describes WAMS applications with a focus on three main
applications, namely PAM, Fast Voltage Stability Index (FVSI) and Impedance Stability
Index (ISI).
2.2.1 Role in Smart Grid
As an upgrade of the legacy SCADA system, WAMS is used to gather, process, and trans-
mit physical data to different applications for monitoring, control, and protection purposes
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of transmission systems. WAMS allow grid-wide, information, communication, and coor-
dination against major disturbances and blackouts [5]. WAMS rely on a dense hierarchical
communication network to transfer the data from the sensors in the field to the control cen-
ter. The transmitted data is used in different applications to reflect the state of the grid to
the operator. Accordingly, the operator will determine the appropriate course of action that
will maintain the stability and security of the grid [5]. The cyber components deployed in
WAMS structure provide real-time, accurate monitoring of the state of the grid allowing
for faster remedial actions in case of faults, disturbances, or performance degradation.
2.2.2 Communication System
In order to track the fast-dynamics of fault and failures in the smart grid, which may occur
for less than a second, WAMS relies heavily on advanced cyber infrastructure and dedi-
cated protocols to transmit data between control centers and field devices over hundreds
to thousands of kilometers. As the key innovative sensing technology, PMUs installed at
selected locations of the grid collect current, voltage, phase, and frequency measurements
and transmit them to PDCs that time-align and combine measurements coming from mul-
tiple PMUs, and forward them to higher level PDCs, and ultimately the control center.
The measurements are time-stamped and synchronized using Global Positioning System
(GPS) receivers with up to one microsecond accuracy [5]. The time-aligned measurements
provide high-resolution snapshots of interconnected smart grid system over spatial and
temporal domains. WAMS offers unprecedented granularity of steady states and transients
and enables advanced early warning against widespread disturbances. An overview of the
WAMS architecture is shown in Fig. 2. The volume and speed of data exchange in WAMS
also impose stringent latency constraints. While early WAMS standards requires as few
as 10 samples per second, the latest standards are setting forth real-time sampling rates up
to 12,800 Hz [18]. In order to accommodate the temporal resolution, dedicated protocols
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have been developed for WAMS systems to transmit data between PMUs and PDCs, which
include IEEE 1344, IEEE C37.118, and IEC 61850 [6].
Figure 2: WAMS Network Architecture
2.2.3 Communication Protocols
The communication of synchrophasor measurements from PMUs in the field to the control
center is done by using WAMS-specific communication protocols. With different regula-
tions pertaining to different regions, 2 main protocols have been developed for synchropha-
sor communication: The widely used IEEE C37.118 [19] and the newer IEC 61850-90-
5 [20]. Both establish data transmission formats for real-time synchrophasor data transfer.
9
Figure 3: IEEE C37.118 Protocol Stack.
IEEE C37.118
IEEE C37.118 addresses the measurement and communication needs for synchrophasors,
which represent requirements for accuracy verification, data transmission formats and real-
time communication. IEEE C37.118 was first introduced in 2005 as the successor of the
IEEE 1344 protocol; in 2011, it was split into IEEE C37.118.1 for measurement-related
requirements and IEEE C37.118.2 for data transfer requirements [18].
The IEEE C37.118 protocol stack is illustrated in Fig. 3. IEEE C37.118.1 defines mea-
surements including synchrophasor, frequency, and Rate of Change of Frequency (RO-
COF); it also specifies the steady-state and dynamic performance requirements as well as
time synchronization and data rates [21]. However, it does not tackle the different frame
formats, their structures and functions, which are the main points of interest for DPI, be-
cause these attributes have to be leveraged by any DPI application to identify IEEE C37.118
packets, their type, and extract the information they carry. Such attributes are detailed in
IEEE C37.118.2, which specifies message types, use, contents, and data formats for real-
time communication between PMUs, PDCs, and other devices [18].
The IEEE C37.118 standard defines four types of messages related to the configuration
and data transfer for PMU/PDC communication: data, configuration, header, and command
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frames. The first three frame types (data, configuration, and header) are sent from a PMU or
a PDC, carrying synchrophasor measurements and configurations such as channel numbers
and readable descriptive information. The last frame type (command) can be sent to both
PMU and PDC for configuration and control purposes. All frame types share a common
structure that includes frame identification and synchronization, frame size, data stream ID,
timestamp, time quality, and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) error check.
The data frames hold the measurement data, frequency and ROCOF collected and cal-
culated by the PMU or PDC, as well as other analog sample and digital values. The con-
figuration frames carry information and processing parameters of the data that the sender
IED is capable of and is currently broadcasting. The header frames carry human-readable
information about the PMU, the data sources, scaling and other related information. The
command frames are sent by data receiving devices to the sending devices, with requests
to start or stop transmission. These frames may also carry commands to send configuration
information or to change configuration.
IEC 61850
IEC 61850 is a comprehensive standard for substation-based smart grid communications
first published in 2004 [22]. As an Ethernet-based communication protocol intended
for IEDs in electrical substations, IEC 61850 identifies general and specific communica-
tion functional requirements, which include high-speed IED-to-IED communication, high-
availability, time requirements, multi-vendor interoperability, support for voltage and cur-
rent measurements data, support for file transfer, and support for security features, among
others [23]. The IEC 61850 defines abstract objects for the communication services using
the Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI), through which the abstract objects
are mapped to existing protocols.
This protocol-independent setup of data objects and services allows a mapping to any
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Figure 4: IEC 61850 Protocol Stack
new protocol that meets the defined data and service requirements [24]. This ensures the
compatibility of protocols between a variety of power system components.
An overview of the IEC 61850 protocol stack is shown in Fig. 4. Currently, the stan-
dard maps the abstract objects to three main protocols [25]: Generic Object Oriented Sub-
station Events (GOOSE), Sampled Values (SV), and Manufacturing Message Specification
(MMS). GOOSE and SV are time-critical protocols involved in the protection and control
of the substation; both GOOSE and SV operate on layer 2 of the OSI model to decrease
the communication overhead. MMS operates on layer 3 of the OSI model and deals with
substation devices management.
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GOOSE. GOOSE is used to send control signals and warnings in substations when time-
critical events take place [26]: as an example, protection commands are sent over GOOSE
to substation IEDs within a four-millisecond time window. Consequently, applying en-
cryption or authentication algorithms on GOOSE messages can be challenging because of
the strict time constraints. In order to assure the integrity of the transmitted information,
GOOSE will re-transmit the same message multiple times, which ensures receipt of the
message and allows the receiver to compare the different messages and detect potential
tampering or anomalies. GOOSE can also broadcast a wide range of data in a dataset
across the substation Local Area Networks (LAN). A GOOSE frame consists of fixed,
preset fields and variable fields in terms of length and content depending on the commu-
nicated information. Each frame can be divided into four parts: header MAC, priority tag
information, Ethernet Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and GOOSE Application Protocol Data
Unit (APDU) [26]. The header MAC, priority tag information and Ethernet PDU contain
standard protocol and routing information such as destination and source IDs, protocol and
virtual LAN identifiers, application identifier, and length [24]. The GOOSE APDU holds
the state and sequence numbers that ensure message synchronization between the GOOSE
sender and receiver.
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SV. SV is used to transmit numerically sampled real-time values of power system mea-
surements, such as line currents and voltages. It uses a publisher-subscriber model, where
registered PMUs publish their measurements in the substation network such that subscrib-
ing PDCs can collect them [24]. In addition, SV has a very high sampling rate that can
reach 4,800 messages per second. Consequently, encryption of the measurements may im-
pose a large overhead on the network and violate the preset time constraints. SV utilizes
different packet fields such as sequence number, sample count field and the time synchro-
nization field to ensure the alignment of the received packets by the subscriber IED and
the synchronization with the time source [27]. SV frames have a similar structure to that
of GOOSE, which are divided into header MAC, priority tag information, Ethernet PDU
and SV APDU. The measurements are encapsulated within the SV APDU, along with a
sequence number field, a sample count field and the time synchronization field.
MMS. MMS is a client-server protocol used to transmit status information and com-
mands for control, monitoring, and communication between user-interface systems and
IEDs. MMS maps ACSI models of IEC 61850 to lower levels to ensure correct interpre-
tation of information among IEDs [28]; the mapping includes a multitude of IEC 61850
objects, e.g., the data class, data-set and log classes. An MMS frame consists of a fixed
sized header that contains information pertaining to version and packet length, and a PDU
that holds a four-bit type specification field that indicates the type of the PDU, followed by
the payload [29].
IEC 61850-90-5. IEC 61850-90-5 [20] was introduced in 2012 as an extension to the
original IEC 61850 standard to address WAMS synchrophasor communications. It defines
Routable GOOSE (R-GOOSE) and Routable SV (R-SV) packets which are layer 3 versions
of the original GOOSE and SV protocols. These packets are used to establish connections,
and transfer synchrophasor data between PMUs and PDCs. Furthermore, IEC 61850-90-5
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emphasises communication security by introducing HMAC signature schemes and AES
symmetric encryption to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the messages. It also
offers a higher sampling rate than IEEE C37.118 that can reach 12000 samples/second.
Table 1 presents a comparison of the features of the protocols.
Table 1: Feature Comparison Between IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5
Features IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Year 2005 2012
Protocol Stack Network Layer Network Layer




Average Data Packet Size 112 bytes 305 bytes
2.2.4 WAMS Applications
WAMS applications improve on traditional SCADA systems with a faster, more dynamic
and proactive grid stability management approach. These applications help the grid opera-
tors improve the performance of the transmission and distribution networks by portraying
information about stability, system security and efficiency.
WAMS applications include phase angle monitoring, voltage stability monitoring, and
power oscillation monitoring among others. In this thesis we focus on 3 applications: PAM,
FVSI and ISI. Next we will define each application, and explain its role in the control center.
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Phase Angle Monitoring
PAM examines the active power going through a power line. It calculates the difference in






where Pr is the real power going through the line, Vs is the sending-end voltage, Vr
is the receiving-end voltage, X is the line impedance between the two buses, and ∆ is the
difference between the voltage angles αs and αr.
Based on the angle difference, the operator may initiate different actions to improve
the stability of the grid such as rescheduling generation or compensation of reactive power,
reconfiguration of system topology, and load shedding [30].
Fast Voltage Stability Index
FVSI is a line voltage stability index that can determine the maximum possible line load,
critical lines in inter-connected systems, and the point of voltage collapse [31]. It is calcu-





where Z is the line impedance, X the line reactance, Qi the reactive power at the receiving
end, and Vi the voltage at the sending end. FVSI can range from 0 to 1. An FVSI value
greater than 0.7 implies that the line is exhibiting instabilities. In such situations, the oper-
ator may disconnect the line or modify the generator’s supply to avoid further damages and
a possible system collapse.
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Impedance Stability Index
ISI is a bus voltage stability index that leverages the load impedance and Thevenin
impedance at a load bus to determine the point of voltage collapse [32]. It is calculated
following Equation 3.
ISI = 1− ∆Vj × Iji
Vj ×∆Iij (3)
where ∆Vj and ∆Iij are the differences between two consecutive voltage and current mea-
surements reported by PMUs, respectively. Vj and Iji correspond to the voltage and current
values at load bus j. ISI can range from 0 to 1. An ISI value close to 0 indicates critical
voltage instability at the bus, which can lead the operator to inject reactive power, adjust
the generation or initiate load shedding.
2.3 Cybersecurity Threats in WAMS
The critical role of WAMS in the SG renders it an appealing target for cyber attackers.
In addition, the deployment of densely connected information systems increases the at-
tack surface that can be used to compromise WAMS. Attackers can take advantage of the
cyber-physical nature of WAMS and launch cyberattacks against the information system
and attacks against the physical assets in the grid. The closely connected physical and digi-
tal aspects of WAMS allow cyberattacks to have an impact on the physical operation of the
grid. Harmful impacts from such attacks include increase in cost, power loss, transmission
line tripping, unnecessary load shedding, and blackouts. Understanding an attacker’s per-
spective is often a key to the successful defense. As such, extensive efforts have been made
to investigate prominent cyber-physical attacks and develop DPI-based Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) taking into account the cyber-physical context [33]. In order to better dis-
cuss the discovered threat models in the context of DPI, this section will categorize the
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threats based on where the anomalous or malicious information is injected to affect the
packet payloads. Specifically, the threats addressed will be categorized based on whether
the intrusion is predominantly launched on the IEDs or in the communication channels. It
is notable that a large number of schemes can be launched on both targets.
2.3.1 Attacks on Endpoints
Attacks on IEDs aim to gain access to the endpoint devices and directly tamper with the
generation of the packets. To this end, attackers may exploit back-doors, firmware vulnera-
bilities, specialized malwares, phishing emails, or may attempt to physically access the IED
in remote sites. The targeted IEDs may range from Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
as in the Stuxnet attack [12] to control center workstations as in the Ukrainian power grid
attack [8], and all the RTUs, PMUs, intelligent relays, and PDCs in-between. It is notable
that many critical endpoint IEDs are protected behind industrial firewalls or demilitarized
zones. Also, the attackers may not be able to manipulate all packet payloads on a com-
promised device because of restricted access to overwrite in many fixed-function IEDs.
Nevertheless, from the attacker’s perspective, the IEDs may provide convenient capacity
and privilege for them to send legitimate messages at the full speed to inflict great impacts
on the grid with false commands and/or misleading information. The attacks in this class
include packet modification, false data injection, command injection, and fuzzing which
we will detail next.
Packet modification
Packet modification attacks assume that the attackers have gained access to the sensing
devices and can directly manipulate different packet fields to trigger improper behavior
in the system. As one of the most intuitive threat models, packet modification has been
investigated extensively in generic ICT networks, while a small number of studies have
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been dedicated to the smart grid context.
False Data Injection
The term FDI can be used to describe an attack that injects any type of data in the system
such as measurements, commands, configuration information, etc. However, in this thesis,
we use the term FDI to refer to attacks that target solely the measurements as described
in [34] and we consider command injection attacks as a separate class of attacks.
FDI is a widely investigated threat that targets exclusively the measurements reported
for grid control decision-making. It can be viewed as a special case of packet modification
with significant impacts on the smart grid. As the term FDI may refer to any attack that
injects false data into the system, we specify two classes of FDI: the generic FDI and the
stealthy FDI. In the generic FDI, an attacker sends false measurements to the control center
without particularly leveraging the specific residual-based model vulnerability and grid
topology [34]. The stealthy FDI is a special data integrity attack first proposed by Liu et
al. [34] to exploit a mathematical model vulnerability in the power system state estimation.
While the threat has yet to be implemented as part of a practical scheme, numerous studies
have shown that the stealthy FDI scheme can exploit the knowledge of system topology to
manipulate the measurements, without being detected by the existing residual-based Bad
Data Detector (BDD) installed in control centers.
State estimation can be formulated by the linear function:
z = Hx+ n (4)
where z is the measurement vector, H is the topological Jacobian matrix, x is the state
vector to be estimated, and n is the noise vector. The estimated state xˆ can be given by:
xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z (5)
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where R is the covariance matrix of an assumptive zero-mean white Gaussian noise of the
sensors. The conventional BDD calculates the residual between observed and estimated
measurements:
z −Hxˆ (6)
to identify and eliminate a noisy data. With the knowledge of H and the ability to manipu-
late z, however, it has been shown [34] that an attacker can effectively bypass the BDD and
manipulate the measurements. While no incidences have been reported, extensive studies
have shown that the stealthy FDI can cause transmission congestion, mask line outages,
and obtain illegal gains in the electricity market, among others [35].
Command Injection
Command injection is one of the most impactful threats, where an attacker directly issues
a false command to the IEDs and actuators. For the smart grid, command injection can
cause immediate impact on critical systems and processes under control, especially when
limited response time is allowed for authentication or verification between the arrival and
execution of a command in many protection and control applications.
Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a common threat on packet generation. In this scenario, the attacker tries to
randomly modify the packet content to create invalid or unexpected packet fields. The
device receiving the modified packet is then observed to detect exceptions such as crashes
and memory leaks as a result of the received random information [36].
2.3.2 Attacks on Communication Channels
Compared to the endpoint IEDs, communication networks and channels constitute a large
attack surface over dispersed geographical areas, making them attractive targets to intercept
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the packets and manipulate their payloads. The low-speed, security-deficient SCADA net-
works and protocols have long been a target of cyber-attacks [37]; even in the high-speed
Industrial Control System (ICS) networks that allow limited time to tamper with the packet
payloads, skillful intrusions [38] and advanced persistent threats [39] can still effectively
compromise the network to inflict major disturbances into the interconnected power grids.
The threats in this category include scanning, sniffing, spoofing, Denial-of-Service (DoS)
and Distributed DoS (DDoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), and replay attacks, whose de-
tails will be reviewed next.
Scanning Attack
Scanning is a common precursor for most cyberattacks. This information gathering tech-
nique has been increasingly employed by ICS and smart grid attackers [40] to gain high-
level intelligence of network topology, communication protocols, and traffic patterns to
conceive a sophisticated attack scheme, especially for power systems with proprietary net-
works, protocols, and ports.
Sniffing Attack
Sniffing is another early stage attack, where an attacker passively eavesdrops or examines
the content of packets. Records of packets of interest may be retained without manipulating
the traffic, providing detailed information on physical system environment, configuration
and behaviors to construct well-informed attacks [33]. In the smart grid, sniffing has been
shown to provide crucial in-depth intelligence of the interconnected systems and devices,
as shown in Fig. 5. The figure depicts an HMI screenshot of a power plant ICS intelli-
gence acquired by threat actors, reported in ICS-CERT Technical Alert 18-074A [38]. The
screenshot shows redacted information of a generator-turbine control panel with system
specifications and dynamic status [38].
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Figure 5: HMI Screenshot Sniffed by Threat Actors in the U.S. Energy Infrastructure
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Spoofing Attack
Spoofing is a critical threat in the smart grid [41], where an attacker infiltrates the network
by disguising as a legitimate user in order to initiate a trusted connection. A successful
spoofing can allow the attacker to inject malwares, bypass access controls, mislead honest
devices, and obtain confidential data. Spoofing attacks may also involve the connection
of an unidentified rogue device into the network to conduct scanning, sniffing, and other
schemes.
Denial-of-Service and Distributed DoS
DoS and DDoS are prominent cyber-threats [42,43] that can also significantly compromise
availability in the smart grid [44]. On the Internet, DoS/DDoS attacks like Mirai botnet [45]
prevented massive numbers of users from accessing network resources or hardware devices.
In the context of smart grid, DoS/DDoS can result in degraded, delayed, or completely
disconnected communication, impairing situational awareness and control capacity over
critical systems and processes in the smart grid.
Replay Attack
Replay attack is a widely-seen threat that records past packets and re-sends them at a future
time. The re-sent packets usually follow the same legitimate format except for outdated
sequence numbers or timestamps; as a result, checking and ensuring the freshness of the
received packets can mitigate such attacks. In the context of smart grid communication,
replay attack is mainly focused on synchrophasors, where the attacker would replay mea-
surements of recorded faults or disturbance to mislead the controller into adopting improper
responses against non-existent events.
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Man-in-the-Middle Attack
MITM attack is another common generic threat model in the smart grid. It refers to the
family of schemes where attackers are able to insert themselves in the network between the
sender and the receiver of a communication [46]. This can be leveraged to launch attacks
such as sniffing, spoofing, and replay attacks among others.
2.4 Deep Packet Inspection
2.4.1 Definition
DPI is a widely-used context-aware security monitoring technique for cybersecurity [47]. It
analyzes the payloads of packets passing network inspection points, e.g., firewalls, routers
or switches, in order to find matching patterns corresponding to a known misuse, intrusion,
or other incidences. Compared to common packet filtering techniques, the term “deep" in
DPI refers to the direct inspection of payloads, or the actual contents to be communicated,
for anomalous or malicious activities. Compared to packet headers and network flow statis-
tics, the payloads may carry more information on the context of communication and may
reveal additional traces of the activities of interest. Such advantage often makes DPI a pop-
ular choice to examine network application signatures, detect potential intrusions, identify
sensitive information leakage, manage network bandwidth, enforce copyright protection,
and censor digital contents, among others [48]. A typical DPI procedure consists of two
main functionalities, i.e., recognition and action [47]. During recognition, relevant infor-
mation such as application protocols and data units are extracted and compared to a set of
pre-defined anomalous or malicious patterns. If a match is found, actions may be triggered
to raise an alarm, drop the packet, log the event, and/or inform the administrator.
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2.4.2 Deep Packet Inspection in the Smart Grid
Most of the existing works on DPI applications in the smart grid focus on the recogni-
tion functionality due to the complexity of the action functionality: in the Internet and
other communication networks, actions by DPI can be determined within the context of
cyberspace; in the smart grid and other cyber-physical systems, however, most actions
are dependent on the physical system applications and requirements, which can involve
sophisticated physical system processes and responses. As opposed to traditional Informa-
tion Technology (IT) systems, the main focus in Operational Technology (OT) and cyber-
physical systems is on data availability and timeliness subsequently, DPI cyberattack detec-
tion measures should be accurate and fast in order avoid any delays in the communications.
Furthermore alerting should be real-time to allow for fast reaction in order to avoid damage
to physical assets. In addition, cyber-physical systems such as the SG have unique commu-
nication protocols with real-time performance demands that carry domain specific data like
voltage and current measurements [49]. In this thesis, we discuss detection and classifica-
tion as two critical tasks of DPI in smart grid security and we focus on anomaly detection
for a specific attack threat. In both tasks, the inspection of the payloads may foster the
discovery of otherwise stealthy attacks without knowing the context. To illustrate the im-
portance of DPI, consider an insider who launches a data integrity attack by modifying the
measurements, which may result in major consequences by evoking unnecessary control
responses without affecting the header fields. In practice, such attack can be launched by
a grudging employee who may access field devices and manipulate the readings. Simple
access control policies may not flag the access as anomalous; network and system manage-
ment tools may not detect abnormal behavior when traffic statistics, e.g. packet size, packet
delivery rate, and inter-arrival time, are not affected. The “shallow" packet inspection that
analyzes header fields like MAC addresses, IP addresses, and/or port numbers may also be
bypassed as these fields would remain normal to the system. With DPI that monitors the
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content of the network, however, anomalies against system models, predictable trends, or
safety margins could be flagged and reported for further investigation, thus restricting and
mitigating the potential impact of the attack [50].
2.5 Anomaly Detection
The abundance of cyber-physical data and the complexity of cyber-physical threats have
attracted significant interest and progress on the context-aware DPI methods for smart grid
security monitoring. In general, these methods can be categorized into two categories, i.e.,
anomaly detection and attack classification, which focus on the identification of anoma-
lous and malicious events, respectively. Based on the physical context utilized in the DPI
techniques, both categories can be further divided into rule-based and data-driven tech-
niques: the former leverages physical models and system specifications to derive rule sets
and attack signatures, while the latter employs data mining and machine learning methods
to derive new models that characterize anomalous or malicious patterns. The DPI-based
anomaly detection focuses on the segregation of anomalous data and events from normal
operations. The anomalies refer to the nonconforming patterns, which can be characterized
based on pre-defined physical models in rule-based techniques or measurement-based sta-
tistical models in data-driven techniques [51]. In this thesis we focus on anomaly detection
because anomaly detection methods only require normal data to train and develop which
aligns with the real-world operation of the smart grid where normal data is abundant but
attack data is scarce.While classification requires data corresponding to normal and attack
instances which is very hard to generate in a real setting because of the potential damage
such attacks can have.
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2.5.1 Rule-based Anomaly Detection
Rule-based anomaly detection depends on expert knowledge, standards and system specifi-
cations to set conditions that model the normal behavioral patterns. Subsequently, the rules
developed tend to be simple to understand and can be easily interpreted by the operator.
Anomalies are instances that break any one of the set rules. However, developing rules
that cover all possible normal scenarios in a complex system, such as the smart grid, can
become strenuous and almost unattainable.
2.5.2 Data-driven Anomaly Detection
Data-driven techniques employ data mining and machine learning methods such as statis-
tical inferences, unsupervised learning, and semi-supervised learning [52]. These methods
take complex data, such as PMU measurements, as input, and create models of normal op-
erations from the measurements. Data-driven techniques require sizeable training datasets
to produce robust, well-grounded models capable of capturing compound non-linear pat-
terns, in order to differentiate between normal system measurements and anomalies.
2.6 Classification
For classification of different attack scenarios, most works in the DPI literature also uti-
lize either the rules based on attack signatures and system specifications, or the data-driven
methods based on supervised machine learning. Similar to the rule-based anomaly detec-
tion, the rule-based attack classification rely on expert knowledge to develop the rules that
can classify a packet into the category of attacks, faults, and normal operations, or their po-
tential sub-types. The supervised machine learning also aims to achieve the same objective
by using measurement data labeled as normal, fault, and attack. When a sufficient amount
of labeled data is available, an accurate mapping can be generated such that unlabeled data
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can be assigned corresponding labels with high confidence [53]. As suggested by the term
supervised, labels must be pre-acquired to obtain the mapping through an adaptive train-
ing process, however, obtaining labeled data for large-scale, realistic datasets may be very
costly
2.6.1 Rule-Based Classification
Rule-based attack classification depends on expert knowledge to assign the classes through
rules, attack signatures and system specifications that must be obtained for different con-
ditions. Other than the simplicity and efficiency, one main advantage of rule-based DPI in
attack classification is the interpretability of labels, which allows the controller to precisely
investigate the misbehavior and take necessary action quickly. An instance is considered
an attack if it follows all the rules of specific attack signature. Consequently, rule-based
techniques usually produce a smaller number of false alarms because the rules are specifi-
cally tailored to each attack. However, developing such rules and signatures can be tedious
and hard, and might not scale up to large complex systems.
2.6.2 Data-Driven Classification
To address the growing complexity of attack classification in the smart grid, significant
interest has been drawn to the data-driven methods, particularly supervised machine learn-
ing and deep learning, for the development of DPI techniques. These models take large,
complex datasets that contain data from normal and attack scenarios in order to learn to
differentiate between them. Data-driven techniques require large datasets for training, and
usually perform better the larger the training dataset.
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the concepts and technologies related to the studied
research topic. These include legacy SCADA systems and modern WAMS. This chapter
discussed the difference between SCADA and WAMS, and the role of WAMS in the SG.
It also discussed the architecture of the communication system in WAMS, the WAMS-
specific communication protocols, and the different WAMS applications. Furthermore, this
chapter outlined the cybersecurity threats, their locations and types in WAMS. In addition,
this chapter outlined specific concepts related to DPI, classification, and anomaly detection,
which are used in the proposed solution of this research work tackling the problem of
WAMS security. The provided background information lays out a good foundation to better




This chapter presents a literature review on the topics of FDI attacks, anomaly detection,
and classification for the security of different areas of the SG. The background knowledge
on these topics represents an important element of this research work. The related work
on FDI attacks describes two types of FDI attacks: generic and stealthy. In addition, it
discusses recent surveys tackling FDI schemes and countermeasures, and it highlights dif-
ferent approaches utilized to detect FDI attacks. The related work on anomaly detection
describes the different anomaly detection models applied to detect cyberattacks in the SG.
It groups the approaches into two main categories: rule-based and data-driven, and each
category is further split into several subcategories. Similarly, classification models used
to characterize cyberattacks in the different SG domains are presented in the classification
section. They are also divided into rule-based and data-driven categories with each category
split into several subcategories. Fig. 6 shows the taxonomy of the studied DPI techniques
based on methodologies. Furthermore, we summarize all the works related to WAMS, in
the WAMS-specific section, where we highlight the benefits and limitations of each work,
and we present the different research gaps that can be addressed, which include the topic
tackled in this thesis.
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3.1 False Data Injection
FDI attacks can be categorized in two main classes as previously outlined in Section 2.3.1:
generic FDI and stealthy FDI. Generic FDI has been studied from the control side and from
the customer side of the SG. On the control side, the generic FDI has been the subject of
various DPI investigations with smart grid specific protocols, including Modbus [54, 55],
IEC 60870-5-104 [56], IEEE C37.118 [57], and IEC 61850 SV [58], among others. On the
customer side, the generic FDI attacks are often leveraged in energy theft, which manip-
ulate the smart meter readings to report a lower consumption and obtain a financial gain.
Attacks on Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs) can target ANSI C12.19, C12.22,
IEEE 802.15.4, and other AMI-related protocols at various geographic locations [59, 60].
On the other hand, stealthy FDI was first introduced in [34] to exploit a vulnerability
in the mathematical model of the power system state estimation. It is directed exclusively
against the measurements used in the decision-making process of the system operator. In
recent years, interest has increased in stealthy FDI attacks and their detection, and this
can be seen by the large number of articles tackling this problem. As a result, recent
surveys have provided a comprehensive audit of the state-of-the-art FDI attacks and defense
strategies [61–64]. As stealthy FDI attacks manipulate the physical measurements directly,
most IDS employed against these FDI schemes will rely on DPI techniques to identify the
threats, although a small number of statistical methods have also been proposed, as can be
seen in these surveys. To date, different studies have investigated DPI solutions against
stealthy FDI threats for WAMS [65–67], substations [68], microgrids [69] along with other
studies that tackle this problem without specifying a particular domain of the SG [70–74].






Rule-Based [54–56, 58, 75–95]
Data-Driven [66–70, 72, 89, 96–122]
Attack
Classification
Rule-Based [56, 94, 95]
Data-Driven [57, 65, 91, 96, 123–135]
Figure 6: Taxonomy of DPI Techniques Based on Methodologies.
3.2 Anomaly Detection
Based on the existing studies in the literature we split the anomaly detection techniques
into two large categories: Rule-based and data-driven. Both categories are unsupervised
learning approaches since the models learn the normal behavior of a system from reg-
ular, none-attack data points only. We further split rule-based approaches based on the
communication protocol they model. However, data-driven models are divided into five
subcategories: statistical inferences, clustering methods, decision trees, neural networks,
and kernel methods.
3.2.1 Rule-Based Deep Packet Inspection for Anomaly Detection
Rule-based anomaly detection has been mostly investigated based on protocols used in dif-
ferent applications of the smart grid. The rules are system-specific: for example, rule sets
for PMUs made by different vendors or installed for different monitoring purposes [136].
Subsequently, developing scalable or reusable rules for all possible normal scenarios can
become tedious for the interconnected and inter-operating devices in the smart grid. Nev-
ertheless, for fixed-function IEDs and small-scale systems, rule-based DPI-based anomaly
detection has been widely investigated. The works in this area will be reviewed below.
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Modbus Protocol
Rule-based anomaly detection has been shown to be highly effective on Modbus due to
the simplicity of the protocol. Morris et al. [54] described the conversion of Modbus RTU
to Modbus/TCP and develop 11 rules to detect intrusions in Modbus/TCP. The rules were
tested in two settings: in the passive setting, network traffic is logged and intrusion detec-
tion is performed offline; in the inline setting, the IDS takes the role of as an intrusion pre-
vention system (IPS) and drops anomalous packets. The simulations showed that the inline
IPS introduces time delays that can be acceptable depending on the system requirements.
The work was further extended to 50 IDS rules [79] using a comprehensive specification
of Modbus/TCP and Modbus over Serial Line protocol packet fields. Collectively, these
DPI rules examine the majority of packet fields, including transaction identifier, protocol
identifier, unit identifier and function code. Faisal et al. [75] used the Modbus specifi-
cation and expert knowledge to develop detection rules over Modbus/TCP function code
field and packet response time. The rules are customized for the communication require-
ments, which were tested on real-life datasets from a water storage facility and a university
campus power grid. The results demonstrated that the rule-based DPI is both more ac-
curate and efficient compared to conventional Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) and
Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs). A hybrid IDS automata was proposed in [55],
which combines the communication network rules with the physical system limits to detect
the anomalies. The method examines control commands, current measurements, circuit
breaker status, packet sequence, elapsed time between consecutive packets and physical
systems constraints to monitor the entire traffic and context of Modbus communication.
The results demonstrated that the hybrid automata can effectively detect malicious packet
injection, malicious transformer isolation, or imitation of the master controller’s behavior.
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DNP3 Protocol
Similarly to Modbus, DNP3 has the protocol simplicity that benefits rule-based detection
techniques. Wei et al. [76] proposed a role-based access control and deep packet inspec-
tion system for DNP3 in distribution substations. The IDS inspects the DNP3 function
code, source and destination station numbers, object group, as well as their variation and
index. The experiments showed that while effective at detecting and preventing illegiti-
mate access to IEDs, the approach added a round trip delay of five to twenty milliseconds
between master and slave. Lin et al. [86] also proposed a rule-based intra-packet and inter-
packet validation for DNP3. The intra-packet validation examines the fields in a single
packet (e.g., if the value of the length field is consistent with the real payload length) while
inter-packet rules investigate the sequence of packets. For example, a packet holding the
command “OPERATE" is almost always issued right after a “SELECT" command packet to
control the remote field devices chosen by the previous “SELECT" packet. This technique
was used to analyze real-life data coming from an Ohio electrical power grid utility. The
results showed that the DNP3 parser processed 30% more packets/second that the DNP3
analyzer. This is due to the costly analysis performed on almost all DNP3 fields.
IEC 61850 Protocols
IEC 61850 has been the most investigated standard for rule-based anomaly detection due
to its popularity, importance, and comprehensive specifications for monitoring, protection,
and control. Hong et al. [58] investigated rules over GOOSE and SV packets for host-based
and network-based IDS solutions. The host-based IDS examines device settings and logs,
while the network-based aspect evaluates GOOSE and SV packet fields such as sequence
and state numbers in GOOSE and message counts in SV. Under different attacks, both IDS
perform similarly well with false positive and false negative rates lower than 0.1%. The
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work also introduced an attack similarity index that leverages data from multiple substa-
tions to detect coordinated, multi-substation attacks. Kwon et al. [78] proposed statistical
rules for GOOSE and MMS packets using a multitude of flow features. These include the
rates of packets, bytes and connections, the recency, frequency and monetary aspect of
GOOSE packets, and the MMS messages such as confirmed response and unconfirmed re-
port. Each feature is weighted and they are all added to get an anomaly score. This method
was tested under multiple attack scenarios and reported an FP rate of 0% and an FN rate
of 1.1%. Yang et al. [77] developed an IEC 61850 substation-specific IDS. The design is
composed of four components: the access-based detection where Media Access Control
(MAC) address, IP address and port number are inspected; a protocol filter for specific
protocols such as GOOSE and MMS; an anomaly behavior detection that tracks the format
of different fields in the filtered protocol; and a remote signaling checker that inspects if
measurements are within a certain range and if MMS and GOOSE packet contents are con-
sistent. The work was further expanded in [87], where substation configuration language
(SCD) files and IEC 61850 traffic were included for inspections of sequence number incre-
ments in GOOSE, priority field in GOOSE and SV, and SV measurements ranges. The two
studies combine packet headers and payload data with access control, network configura-
tion, signal comparison, and substation settings, providing a holistic view of the substation
behavior in order to improve the detection performance. The results show that the proposed
technique effectively identified the different attack scenarios.
IEEE C37.118 Protocol
Despite its importance, IEEE C37.118 has been less investigated for anomaly detection due
to its complexity. The protocol employs different frames, each carrying different functions
and different data types, that are transmitted at different rates, making it difficult to formu-
late effective rules. Yang et al. [80] investigated behavior-based rules that inspect packet
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protocol pattern, time synchronization of messages, range of physical measurements, and
length of packet fields. The results have shown that the rules were able to properly identify
scanning, sniffing, MITM, and DoS/DDoS attacks. Sprabery et al. [85] also proposed a
rule-based IDS for the IEEE C37.118 synchrophasors. The authors developed 36 single
and multi-packet rules to detect anomalous behavior in each of the four protocol frames.
The rules were tested against a protocol fuzzer in both online and offline settings without
generating any false positives.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure Protocols
DPI techniques have been extensively investigated for IDS in the AMI and smart meters,
especially for energy theft attacks. Berthier et al. [84] propose a rule-based IDS for ANSI
C12.19 and C12.22. The rules focus on identifying compromised meters and network ac-
tivity in Neighborhood Area Networks (NANs) by enforcing network-based, device-based,
and application-based constraints. The technique was able to detect all malicious meter
reading and connection requests in real-time. However, the sensors used do not handle
encryption, which is not the case in realistic setups. Jokar et al. [91] propose a rule-based
energy theft detection that compares the total electricity delivery to a neighborhood based
on transformer meter reading with the total consumption reported by the smart meters of
that neighborhood. A discrepancy between the two values will trigger an alarm signaling
possible theft. The checker is complemented by an support vector machine-based classifier
to confirm and localize the attack. The approach downsamples the data to preserve the
privacy of the customer without compromising the detection performance. Chakraborty et
al. [92] propose an IDS for a dedicated Distributed and Intelligent Energy Theft (DIET)
attack. The proposed IDS monitors a cluster of smart meters and compares the electricity
usage reported by a meter and its neighbors to the total usage calculated by the controller.
The cross-checking allows the IDS to identify inconsistencies and report the anomalies.
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Multiple Protocols
Some of the DPI techniques can be generalized to multiple protocols simultaneously. Yang
et al. [81] extended the work in [80] by including more protocols such as Modbus, DNP3,
IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5 and IEC 60870-6. The extension includes more rules for compli-
ance checks for the additional protocols. Notably, these additional checks can efficiently
monitor multiple protocols without incurring significant latency to the network traffic. Mor-
ris et al. in [83] explore cybersecurity requirements for synchrophasors in multiple proto-
cols. Requirements such as access control, audit requirement, continuity of operation, and
use of cryptography in Modbus and IEEE C37.118 protocols, were derived from the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Inter-agency Report 7628 guidelines
for smart grid security, along with the Department of Homeland Security Cyber-Security
Procurement Language for Control Systems, and the utility internal requirements. The
rules were tested on commercial PMUs and PDCs from different manufacturers, under
DoS and fuzzing attacks. Limited testing results were provided due to confidentiality agree-
ments and ethical reporting requirements.
Bao et al. [88] present encryption for attack prevention and a state machine model for
detection. Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm [137] was implemented and was able to
prevent sniffing and MITM attack. The state machine method successfully detected inside
attackers that tampered with the measurements. However, the authors do not specify the
protocol they considered, they only state that they examined PMU measurements.
3.2.2 Data-Driven Deep Packet Inspection for Anomaly Detection
Data-driven DPI techniques have been effectively introduced in numerous IDS de-
signs [138], which utilize statistical inferences, unsupervised learning, semi-supervised
learning, and other machine learning techniques to create models of normal operations
from the measurements. The data-driven techniques usually require a large number of data
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to create reliable and robust models, which can capture complex nonlinear relations and
patterns that can pinpoint anomalies from system measurements. A variety of data-driven
anomaly detection algorithms have been proposed for DPI-based security monitoring in the
smart grid, which can be categorized into five main classes: statistical inferences, clustering
methods, decision trees, neural networks, and kernel methods. The details are presented
next.
Statistical Inference
Statistical methods are classical anomaly detection techniques that use probability distribu-
tion and statistical tools to identify outliers. In general, data points distant from the distribu-
tion of normal events are flagged as anomalous. Some of the classical statistical inferences
used for anomaly detection include Bloom filter [139], probability density functions and
Chi-square test [140], which are relatively lightweight, efficient, and less data-demanding
compared to other data-driven techniques. Among notable statistical inference-based DPI
techniques for smart grid communication, Kundur et al. [98] proposed a probabilistic IDS
for Modbus/TCP traffic using Bloom filter and n-gram analysis. The IDS inspects the
function codes and PDU collected from normal, remedial, and emergency states to iden-
tify the anomalies. The approach achieved a FNR between 2% and 6% and a FPR of 0%.
The statistical methods have also been shown to be effective against FDI attacks. Pal et
al. [100] proposed a Chi-square test against stealthy FDI attacks. The Gauss-Newton algo-
rithm [141] was used to estimate line parameters, e.g., resistance, inductance, capacitance,
and conductance, from PMU data. A Chi-square test is performed based on known and es-
timated line parameters to detect the anomalies. Chakhchoukh et al. [101] also proposed a
statistical inference approach for anomaly detection. Assuming that the samples observed
by the attacker are drawn from a changing distribution that is different than the one of
normal measurements, the work applies Density Ratio Estimation (DRE) [142] to identify
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anomalous instances. The method calculates the density ratio between the Probability Den-
sity Function (PDF) of normal operations and the PDF of a given observation, on which a
preset threshold determines if the latter represents a class of anomalies. Using stealthy FDI
attacks as the anomalous event, the approach outperforms Support Vector Machines (SVM)
and Gaussian methods under different tested scenarios. Esmalifalak et al. [102] compared
the Gaussian PDF and SVM for detection of stealthy FDI attacks. The Gaussian PDF cal-
culates the probability that a data point is similar to normal data and flags it as anomalous
if the probability is lower than a learned threshold. SVM is applied in a supervised learn-
ing setup. Gaussian PDF outperformed SVM on smaller training sets but performed worse
when the training set size was increased. In a similar work, Gu et al. [103] propose the
use of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to compare dissimilarity between the probability
distributions of normal and attack incidences. Considering both FDI and replay attacks as
the unknown anomalies, the KL divergence achieved more accurate detection performance
than absolute distance. However, it was noted that FDI-induced anomalies on certain buses
were more difficult to detect when there are fewer lines connecting these buses to the rest
of the grid. In addition, the work of Liu et al. [70] introduces two statistical based tech-
niques, nuclear norm minimization and low rank matrix factorization for FDI detection.
These techniques were tested on multiple datasets and under different assumptions such as
missing measurements data and showed effectiveness in detecting FDI attacks with a True
Positive Rate (TPR) of varying between is 93% and 95%. In [72], the authors propose
using a Kalman filter along with a Chi-square detector and a Euclidean distance metric de-
tector to identify FDIs. The Chi-square detector failed to identify stealthy attacks while the
Euclidean distance metric technique succeeded in doing so. The authors in [73] also use a
Kalman filter along with a Chi-square detector which yields the same outcome as [72]. In
addition, [73] proposes a cosine similarity matching approach that was able to detect FDI.
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Clustering Methods
Clustering is a widely-used unsupervised method that groups data points into clusters with-
out knowing any ground truth (actual labels). In anomaly detection, clustering can be ap-
plied to form a group of closely-arranged normal data, outside which a more distant data
point will be considered as anomalous. Kundur et al. [66] propose a clustering-based DPI
against false PMU data injection. Expectation-Maximization (EM) clustering was utilized
to optimize intractable likelihood functions and find missing data points. On the IEEE 14-
bus system, the method was shown to be capable of detecting all false PMU data injected
at different locations of the grid.
Decision Trees
Decision trees are well-established machine learning algorithms. Originally developed for
classification, some of their variants are capable of performing unsupervised anomaly de-
tection. El Chamie et al. [99] propose a physics-based unsupervised and supervised learn-
ing framework to detect anomalies in distribution systems using the measurements. Tested
on an IEEE 34-bus test feeder system, the unsupervised isolation forests learn normal pat-
terns from unlabeled data and represent them with a pseudo-label; a random forest is then
created to map input features to the pseudo-label. A threshold is applied for anomaly de-
tection, which achieves an F1 score of 0.903 against single line to ground fault and breaker
tripping attacks in the distribution system.
Neural Networks
Neural Networks (NN) have seen much success in anomaly detection [138]. As complex
higher-order nonlinear models, NN-based DPI has shown the ability to accurately learn
the patterns of normal behavior out of data and differentiate them from abnormal actions.
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Valdes et al. [68] propose a SOM-based IDS to learn normal behavior patterns of SV mea-
surements in an IEC 61850 substation. In this work, a new class is learned if the feature
vector does not match any known pattern in the SOM. The model was tested using three
setups and achieved 0.01% FPR and 100% attack detection rate in some cases. Hariri et
al. [69] propose a time-series NN with one hidden layer for anomaly detection in micro-
grid SV packets. This lightweight technique achieved a FP rate of 0.5% over anomalies
caused by FDI attacks within the strict time requirements of the protocol. Wang et al. [67]
propose a DAE based anomaly detection against PMU data manipulation in the smart grid.
By inspecting the WAMS measurements, the DAE-based method outperformed other tech-
niques, including XGBoost and SVM, with an F1 score of 0.938. DAE allows to compress
the input into a smaller representation, then tries to reconstruct the initial input vector, by
decoding the information in the compressed representation. In addition, a delayed trig-
gering algorithm is applied to account for noise and reduce FPR. For stealthy FDI detec-
tion, Niu et al. [64] employ Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), a popular feed-forward
ANN, and LSTM neural networks, to account for time-related knowledge. This method ex-
amines measurements and flow features and achieves an accuracy between 80% and 100%
depending on the capabilities of the attacker. In [74], Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
are applied to detect stealthy FDI attacks in the IEEE 14-bus systems. The applied tech-
niques are shown to be successful in detecting FDI attacks with high accuracy, achieving
an F1 score of 0.95.
Kernel Methods
Kernel methods like SVM aim to map the data with kernel functions a into higher dimen-
sions, where it would be easier to distinguish the difference among different distributions or
classes of data. The SVM is one the most widely used kernel algorithms, which constructs
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an optimized decision boundary to separate instances of different classes. The unsuper-
vised learning variant of SVM for anomaly detection, known as one-class SVM, has been
shown to be able to handle large, complex datasets in an efficient manner. Yoo et al. [97]
propose a one-class SVM for anomaly detection over the MMS and GOOSE traffic from a
real-life IEC 61850 substation in South Korea. The method processes both single packets
and combined packet sequences to extracted features including MMS message, GOOSE
sequence and state numbers and packet headers. The EM clustering and local outlier factor
(LOF) were applied during data preprocessing to remove outliers, before one-class SVM
was used to develop the normal-behavior model, which achieved a FPR between 0.01 and
0.06.
3.2.3 Deep Packet Inspection for Anomaly Detection
The surveyed research works include an abundance of rule-based anomaly detection tech-
niques in the smart grid. This may be attributed to the simplicity and popularity of some
protocols such as Modbus and DNP3. In addition, it is easier to model the normal behavior
of a system than modeling the malicious behavior of attacks, particularly when attack data
is difficult to obtain.
It was also observed that statistical inference approaches perform well on simple pro-
tocols like Modbus but the number of attack scenarios addressed was relatively small. The
majority of the surveyed statistical methods only focused on anomalies in a single protocol
or those caused by only the FDI attack. In contrast, other data driven methods like ANNs
and SVM have demonstrated convincing performance on larger systems and with more
protocols and attack scenarios. As the smart grid demonstrates increasing non-linearity,
uncertainty, and time-variance, there is a growing interest in moving from rule-based and
statistical DPI toward more advanced data-driven methods.
All the reviewed techniques demonstrated a high accuracy on a variety of datasets or
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testbeds. Some of the articles used real-world smart grid communication traffic from a
university grid [75] or a field substation [87, 97]. A number of recent works leveraged
HIL testbeds for SCADA systems [55, 98], WAMS [96], Substation Automation Systems
(SAS) [58, 68, 77, 78], and microgrids [69]. Software-based simulations were conducted
in the MATLAB/Simulink environment, using standardized test systems like IEEE 14-
bus [66, 67], 34-bus [99], and 118-bus [101, 102] systems to generate the measurements.
The diversity of research works offers an extensive coverage of different operation and
attack scenarios while leaving a significant gap with respect to benchmarking the perfor-
mance among different works.
3.3 Classification
Similarly to anomaly detection, we split the existing classification studies in the literature
into two categories: Rule-based and data-driven. Both categories fall under the supervised
learning class since the models learn from both normal and attack behavior of a system.
We further split rule-based approaches based on the communication protocol they model.
However, data-driven models are divided into four subcategories: statistical methods, near-
est neighbors, decision trees, neural networks, and kernel methods. In addition, some works
present a number of less common ML algorithms along with other works providing com-
parative studies on classification methods on smart grid datasets.
3.3.1 Rule-Based Deep Packet Inspection for Classification
Rule-based DPI techniques for attack classification have also been developed for different
smart grid protocols. Similarly to rule-based anomaly detection, rule-based attack classifi-
cation techniques still face major difficulties to scale up in larger systems or to be reused in
more complicated scenarios. This, coupled with the lack of known attack signatures in the
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SG context, results in a notably reduced number of research works aimed in this direction.
IEC 60870-5-104 Protocol
Compared to other modern protocols for smart grid communication, IEC 60870-5-104 is
one of the least complicated, which allows for easier development of rules based on the
system behavior and attack signatures. Yang et al. [56] developed signature-based and
model-based attack classification, respectively, for IEC 60870-5-104. The signature-based
checker matches observations against an attack signatures database; it also contains rules
that look for unauthorized interrogation commands sent to a server. The model-based
checker inspects the transmission cause, length field and TCP port number of the agent
initiating connections. This allows to create rules based on system specifications and to
classify misuses against these rules.
IEEE C37.118 Protocol
IEEE C37.118 packets carry heterogeneous yet critical information for control, measure-
ments, and configuration settings, which has attracted significant research efforts and was
accompanied by notable results. Khan et al. [94] propose a rule-base classifier for the IEEE
C37.118 synchrophasors based on the NIST-recommended security architecture. The sys-
tem is expected to be deployed in different IEDs, local networks, and wide area networks
in the smart grid. Behavioral patterns of known malicious signatures from all systems will
be collected to classify the data and ongoing events. The design also creates validity rules
that check the range of the physical measurements and rules that track the packet sequences
over time. The rules are shown to be able to accurately identify several attacks on the IEEE
C37.118, including GPS spoofing, MITM, packet injection, and packet drop. The work was
further extended in [95] to include signatures of more sophisticated attacks and new rules to
detect stealthy data manipulation attacks, which gradually modify physical measurements
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over an extended time. The results of this work were validated on a HIL microgrid testbed
and demonstrate that simple rules remain effective against the extended list of attacks.
3.3.2 Data-Driven Techniques
Data-driven classification techniques utilize supervised machine learning techniques to cre-
ate robust models, from labeled datasets, able to distinguish between normal and attack in-
stances. Similar to anomaly detection, data-driven DPI in attack classification also include
statistical methods, nearest neighbors, decision trees and neural networks. As in the case
if anomaly detection, some works present a number of less common ML algorithms while
other works provide comparative studies on classification methods on smart grid datasets.
Subsequently, we detail the work done in each of these classes.
Statistical Methods
Statistical methods, most notably probabilistic graphical models [143], have been intro-
duced for DPI-based attack classification due to their advantage in representing complex
probabilistic relationships using graphical representations. The graphs aim to create a con-
cise encoding of a high-dimensional feature space that expresses the conditional dependen-
cies between features. The main advantage is the use of domain knowledge to create an
intuitive representation of the features and their dependencies, which reduces the compu-
tational overhead for inference and scales up to large, high-dimensional datasets. In this
direction, Pan et al. [57] proposed a Bayesian network for the classification of attacks and
faults in WAMS. The Bayesian network examines current measurements and event logs
under a combination of two fault and four attack scenarios. With a clear depiction of the
dependencies and interdependencies between features, the Bayesian network model is able
to correctly classify all test cases defined in the study.
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Nearest Neighbors
Nearest neighbors are simple, efficient classification techniques that assign a label to an
incoming data sample based on the labels of the nearest data points. The approach does not
need to retain or update a complex model, making it ideal for attack classification at end-
point devices. Adhikari et al. [126] proposed an IDS that creates Non-Nested Generalized
Exemplars (NNGE) from a State Tracking and Extraction Method (STEM). The STEM
pre-processes raw PMU measurements and event logs to generate a continuous stream of
states with low storage overhead. The NNGE, a nearest-neighbor-like algorithm, is trained
on the state stream to extract generalized exemplars. The exemplars are then used as sig-
natures to classify the incoming data into corresponding classes. This hybrid approach
achieved a 98% accuracy in binary classification between benign and malignant events and
a 94% accuracy for multi-class classification among different types of faults, attacks, and
normal operations.
Decision Trees
As mentioned earlier, decision trees are widely used in classification tasks, using a tree
structure that resembles human reasoning and decision-making process to assign the class
labels. They generally rely on entropy measures when segmenting the dataset and building
the tree. The interpretable nature of decision trees is favorable for security applications,
as it provides explainable decision support. For smart grid security monitoring, classic
decision trees are often combined with other pre-processing techniques to improve their
performance over the complex cyber-physical data.
Adhikari et al. [123] propose a DPI-based attack classifier with Hoeffding Adaptive
Trees (HAT), augmented with the Drift Detection Method (DDM) and Adaptive Window-
ing (ADWIN). Using HAT as the base classifier, the approach addresses the fast-dynamics
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and slow-drifts in smart grids by introducing the DDM as a change detector and the AD-
WIN as a model re-trainer. Once significant changes have been identified, ADWIN will
prompt the re-training or fine-tuning of a well-trained HAT to retain its classification per-
formance among normal, fault, and attack classes.
Wang et al. [127] propose an attack classifier against FDI attacks with consideration
of imbalanced data. Assuming that attack incidences are much more scarce than nor-
mal and fault data, the method leverages the Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique
(SMOTE) and Edited Nearest Neighbors (ENN) to create a balanced dataset that is aimed
to boost the classification performance. SMOTE is first applied to randomly select minor-
ity data points and interpolate new data between a selected minority point and its neigh-
bors [144]. The ENN is then applied to clean the oversampled data by removing noisy
outliers in the minority class. With the re-balanced data, XGBoost [145], a more recent
technique that leverages an ensemble of decision trees to improve classification perfor-
mance, is used to classify the FDI attacks. Overall the approach achieves a 0.891 F1 score.
Neural Networks
Instead of trying to learn a representation of normal patterns for anomaly detection, NNs
can also be directly trained to assign class labels to a data sample based on the predicted
likelihood that it belongs to different classes. The prediction is provided through a multi-
layered non-linear mapping between the features and the label of the data sample. The
NN’s ability to extract complex context and relations from measurements to determine the
situation translates well to DPI-based monitoring for the smart grid. He et al. [128] pro-
posed a deep learning-based IDS against stealthy FDI attacks under different conditions
like meter fault, and measurement noise among others. A Conditional Deep Belief Net-
work (CDBN) is developed by stacking multiple Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM)
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layers over a Conditional Gaussian-Bernoulli RBM (CGBRBM) layer that integrates tem-
poral information into the model. The attack data in the dataset are up-sampled using
Fourier transform and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [146] to obtain an adequate
number of compromised instances for training. The CDBN is shown to outperform sim-
ple SVM and NN classifiers, with an accuracy over 90% under simulated attack scenarios.
Hamedani et al. [130] propose Delayed Feedback Networks (DFN) for stealthy FDI de-
tection. The DFN is used as a Reservoir Computing (RC) system to process the data as a
temporal sequence [147]. By taking into account the time-domain information, DFN also
outperformed the SVM and NN classifiers against both generic and stealthy FDI attacks
under different attack scenarios.
Other Data-Driven Deep Packet Inspection for Attack Classification
Other than the well known machine learning techniques, a Common Path Mining (CPM)
technique was also proposed by Pan et al. in two DPI-based attack classifier designs [96,
125]. The CPM creates a generic stateful signature of known scenarios in the smart grid.
In [125], CPM uses system measurements and relay status as features. Against simulated
one-line-ground fault and command injection attacks, CPM achieved a 95% accuracy. In
contrast, when the one-line-ground faults were diversified with different fault locations
and system loads, CPM’s accuracy dropped to 87.6%. Moreover, when four additional
short-circuit faults and three cyberattacks were introduced, CPM accomplished a 93.2%
accuracy. The work was extended in [96] where CPM was evaluated against 25 fault and
attack scenarios. When all scenarios were present in the training set, CPM achieved a
90.4% accuracy with a 0.8% FP rate. Meanwhile, it is notable that CPM performance could
drop to 73.47% when some of the scenarios were randomly removed from the training set,
showing a limited capacity to generalize against some zero-day threats.
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Comparative Studies
Given the popularity and variety of data-driven techniques, some researchers have con-
ducted comparative studies to establish performance benchmarks of well-known data-
driven classifiers. Hink et al. [124] compared the performance of seven different classi-
fication algorithms with different faults and attacks in the smart grid. The models were
tested in three different settings, including a binary case with normal and abnormal (fault
and attack) classes, a ternary case with normal, fault, and attack classes, and a multi-class
case with 37 attack and fault scenarios. Among these three settings, a combination of
AdaBoost [148] and JRip [149] had achieved the highest accuracy of over 90%, followed
by decent performance of JRip and Random Forest that varied between 70% and 80%,
and less-desirable performance of Naive Bayes, SVM, Nearest Neighbor and OneR that
was less than 30% [124]. Comparative studies have also been conducted against FDI at-
tacks. Yan et al. [65] tackled FDI by implementing SVM, k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and
extended-Nearest Neighbor (eNN) for classification of stealthy and generic FDI on bal-
anced and unbalanced datasets. SVM consistently outperformed the other techniques in all
scenarios, while kNN and eNN had comparable results in all scenarios. Ozay et al. [129]
provide a comparative study of 11 machine learning-based classifiers against false data
injection. The techniques include supervised, semisupervised, decision-level and feature-
level fusion, as well as online learning methods. The supervised techniques tested include
perceptron, kNN, SVM, and Sparse Logistic Regression (SLR); S3VM was implemented
as the semisupervised approach; AdaBoost and Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL) have
been utilized for decision-level and feature-level fusion, respectively. Online learning tech-
niques include Online Perceptron (OP) and OP with weighted models, online SVM, and
online SLR were also tested. The methods have been evaluated on variants of FDI that
differ in the attack strength, and the results have shown that kNN was the best-performer in
small-sized systems but conceded to SVM in large-scale systems. The study has also found
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that semi-supervised methods are more robust than supervised methods when dealing with
sparse data. Also, fusion methods were more robust against variations in data sparsity and
system size. Furthermore, online learning and offline batch algorithms achieved similar
results.
3.3.3 Deep Packet Inspection for Smart Grid Attack Classification
Attack classification requires the IDS to not only inform on events that are anomalous
but also to identify those that are malicious, which is generally more challenging than the
anomaly detection. As attack incidences are scarce and effective rules can become highly
sophisticated, we observed a reduced number of rule-based DPI in attack classification.
A lack of attack signature databases in the smart grid may also have limited the research
efforts and progress. Meanwhile, the scarcity of attack data also poses challenges to data-
driven techniques, despite the growing interests with the recent development of deep learn-
ing and other advanced artificial intelligence technology. Pre-processing techniques have
been one of the major innovations in this direction: it has been shown that the efficacy of
predictive models, especially decision trees, is heavily affected by the balance of labeled
training data [150]. The proposed classifications techniques in the literature are validated
on different datasets. Some of the works used WAMS HIL testbeds such as [96, 123, 125],
while others utilized substation HIL testbeds [77, 80, 81]. Additionally, in two other stud-
ies [56,87], data from real-life electric utilities was leveraged to test the classification meth-
ods. Other works have also resorted to datasets of simulated power systems such as the
IEEE 9-bus system [127,129] and IEEE 118-bus system [128,129], among others. Similar
to the case of anomaly detection, the diversity of approaches offers the coverage of more
scenarios while also making it difficult to compare their respective performance.
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3.4 Wide Area Monitoring Systems Specific Works
In the literature, we found 10 research works that tackle attack detection and classification
in WAMS using DPI extracted features. Figure 7 presents a taxonomy of the works based
on the protocol studied. To the best of our knowledge, no research work investigated the
IEC 61850-90-2 protocol. Table 2 details the surveyed works based on the testbed, simu-
lated scenarios, extracted features, proposed technique, and detection performance. Table
3 provides a list of the scenario acronyms used in Table 2. Next, we compare the works
based on each of these aspects.
First, with regards to the testbeds used, we notice that most works [57, 83, 85, 96, 123, 125,
126, 131] rely solely on small HIL testbeds (3-bus and 9-bus systems) and only 2 research
initiatives [67, 151] test their approach on larger systems although their setup does not in-
clude HIL. Including hardware devices in the simulation is critical because this renders it
more realistic and aligned with the operation of real utilities. Moreover, testing the pro-
posed approach on both small and large systems such as the IEEE 30-bus system asses the
scalability of the detection technique and further validates it if the results are consistent.
Therefore, having a HIL setup in addition to evaluating the approach on small and large
systems is essential in order to align the work with real-life grid operation.
Second, the WAMS articles consider different attack and fault scenarios. 5 works
[57,96,123,125,126] simulate a wide array of attack and fault scenarios that include com-
mand injection, relay tripping, over current fault, and line to line fault. Simulating multiple
attack and operational scenarios allows for the collection of large labeled datasets contain-
ing a variety of classes, knowing that such datasets are very rare and not usually shared by
utilities. Subsequently, these works take advantage of a large number of available scenarios
by developing classification models that differentiate between the distinct classes. On the
other hand, the work in [67,83,85,131,151] focuses on 1 or 2 scenarios only. Some of these
works [67, 131, 151] tackle attacks that target the physical measurements directly such as
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FDI and fault replay attacks while others [83, 85] concentrate on fuzzing and DoS.
Third, in most articles except [151], the protocol used is IEEE C37.118 and the extracted
measurement features involve voltage, current, frequency, and ROCOF. Some approaches
[57, 96, 123, 125, 126, 131] combine the physical measurements with network and device
logs in order to get a holistic view of the communications in the network. On the other
hand, the articles studying fuzzing [83, 85] extract all the fields in the IEEE C37.118 and
Modbus packets such as IP source and destination, port numbers, trigger reason, command,
etc. and compare their values to preset rules. Wei et al. [151] specify the WAMS domain
and the features without mentioning which protocol is used. Although all these articles
focus on WAMS, we can see that the features that can be collected in this domain are nu-
merous and heterogeneous, conveying information on different aspects of WAMS. Thus
combining both data-driven and rule-based techniques to monitor the physical features, de-
vice logs, and network communications can be very advantageous.
Fourth, with regards to detection techniques, most articles [57, 96, 123, 125, 126, 131, 151]
focus on classification of attack and fault scenarios using different data-driven techniques
that include statistical inference, tree algorithms, CPM, nearest neighbor, and neural net-
works. The performance of these techniques is similar, ranging between 87% and 99% ac-
curacy, however, it is difficult to directly compare their results and decide which approach
is better because of the differences in the experimental setup, the simulated scenarios and
the evaluation metrics used. Also, one work [96] combined classification and anomaly de-
tection to differentiate zero-day events from known attacks, however, the technique was not
very accurate. On the other hand, only 3 works [67, 83, 85] tackle anomaly detection, 2 of
which [83, 85] are rule-based that focus on fuzzing and the other [67] uses DAE to detect
FDI attacks. The research initiative in [83] modeled normal behavior while the one in [95]
developed attack signatures to monitor all fields in all four IEEE C37.118 frames but did
not provide the rules or detailed results. However, the authors test these rules against simple
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attacks in the context of a microgrid, without providing a detailed validation of the results.
In addition, some of these attacks can be stopped by the security measures implemented in
the IEC 61850-90-5 protocol.
Moreover, we notice a lack of works utilizing machine learning anomaly detection models
against FDI attacks in WAMS. Notably, the initiative in [67] proposes a DAE approach to
detect data manipulation attacks in WAMS, however, their approach requires the collec-
tion of PMU measurements from both sides of each line, which can be very costly because
it requires the deployment of a large number of PMUs. Moreover, the aforementioned
work focused on data manipulation attacks that randomly change the reported values, with
limited focus and analysis of stealthy FDI attacks. Finally, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no works that focus on anomaly detection of stealthy FDI in realistic environ-




IEEE C37.118 [57, 67, 83, 85, 96, 123, 125, 126, 131]
Modbus [83]
Unspecified [151]
Figure 7: Taxonomy of DPI Techniques in WAMS Based on Protocols.
3.5 Gap Analysis
Extensive effort has been made to advance the state of DPI-based security monitoring in
the smart grid. In this section, we provide a gap analysis of the smart grid applications
and communication protocols, threat models, and DPI techniques. Based on the identified
gaps, we reflect on the challenges and future research opportunities.
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3.5.1 Applications and Protocols
Applications coverage
The majority of existing works have investigated SCADA and AMI applications, while
SAS, WAMS, and microgrids are less investigated. Other emerging applications in the
smart grid, such as renewable energy plants, distributed energy resources, demand re-
sponse, distribution automation, among others, have not been investigated. DPI for mi-
crogrids also requires additional attention and exclusive investigations due to their lower
system inertia, higher distributed energy resource installation, and different contexts be-
tween grid-connected and islanded modes. While the technological maturity, especially
the availability of high-resolution physical measurements, may have a strong impact on the
efforts and progress, many of these important applications still require significant enhance-
ments to the security monitoring capacity under the increasing cyber-physical integration.
Protocol Coverage
Smart grid applications are supported by multiple protocols, while the existing coverage in
the DPI literature is still relatively limited. Studies on SAS mostly focused on individual
IEC 61850 protocols, while the incorporation of GOOSE, SV, and MMS messages simul-
taneously may provide additional context for the IDS. Within the IEEE C37.118 protocol,
other frames (configuration, header, command) may also provide the communication sys-
tem context in addition to the data frame. This would provide a holistic view of the WAMS
communication between sensors and controllers and help identify more complex attacks
and faults by integrating communication control information and configuration informa-
tion into the detection models. Moreover, existing DPI works on AMI covered a diverse
set of protocols, mostly due to the availability of public AMI datasets, but few have been
evaluated and validated on a HIL testbed like other applications.
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Protocol Overlap and Discrepancy
With the difference in standard requirements and regional regulations, the same functional-
ity in a smart grid application may be covered by different standards and protocols. As an
example, both IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 specify the requirement and protocol for
synchrophasor communication in WAMS/WAMPACS [18]. To date, most DPI studies for
WAMS focused on IEEE C37.118, which was released earlier than IEC 61850-90-5. Al-
though IEEE C37.118 is currently the most widely used protocol for synchrophasor com-
munication, it lacks security features to ensure confidentiality and strong integrity. IEEE
C37.118 employs CRC checks to ensure integrity of the messages. An attacker knowledge-
able of the CRC algorithm can modify the packet content and re-calculate the CRC field,
allowing it to bypass future CRC verifications. IEC 61850-90-5 was introduced to address
these security shortcomings. To guarantee confidentiality and integrity, IEC 61850-90-5
proposes the use of secret keys – shared and periodically refreshed by a key distribution
center – for symmetric encryption and signature schemes. The proposed security features
can help prevent attacks previously discussed such as sniffing, packet modification, packet
injection, and replay attacks. IEC 61850-90-5 also offers a higher sampling rate through
its R-SV protocol. R-SV has a sampling rate up to 4800 messages/second, compared to up
to 120 messages/second for IEEE C37.118. This would provide the controller with a more
detailed image of the system for real-time monitoring and diagnosis. However, due to the
high sampling rate, encryption and signature schemes, and the bigger size of packets, IEC
61850-90-5 would also require more resources to implement, which calls for more efforts




The threat models addressed in the DPI literature contained certain levels of details, but
most did not specify to the level of attack trees similar to the ones shown in Fig. 13, which
illustrates the ways an attacker can compromise a circuit breaker at a SAS. Such level of
granularity and visualization provides illustrative information and penetration paths of the
threat to design and deploy security monitoring capacities at the most proper locations.
From the attacker’s perspective, many threat models assumed only the worst-case scenario,
while in practice an attacker may not have full access the power grid’s dynamic topology,
operating points, or even the physical models, which will affect the actual impact. A de-
tailed model on the knowledge and resource used to launch a successful intrusion, along
with the projection of potential impacts, will provide a clear picture of cyber-physical vul-
nerabilities and threat intelligence to develop the needed security monitoring capacity for
the smart grid.
Threat Timing and Persistence
The frequent sampling in smart grid communications not only affects the time window to
launch an attack but also the success of a launched threat. Consider the example of FDI:
a high sampling rate would require the attacker to tamper with a large number of packets
over a relatively long period of time to effectively mislead the control actions, as a few
modified SV packets may be simply discarded as outliers without triggering the emergency
response. Therefore, a successful FDI on the SV packets will have to be an advanced
persistent attack, which might not always be possible due to constraints on the attacker’s
resources and the countermeasures in the system. Even if the attacker targets protocols with
low sampling rates like GOOSE, if the allowable packets exchange rate was not obeyed,
the attempt may still be easily detected. As an example, an attacker may inject multiple
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GOOSE commands into the network to trip a targeted relay, which will increase the number
of GOOSE messages received by the subscribed IEDs. This deviation may be exposed
by other context-aware security monitors, such as the Network and System Management
(NSM) devices, who may report to the system manager for further inspection [152].
3.5.3 DPI Methodologies
Online Monitoring
Most data-driven methods have assumed an offline training/building process before online
deployment. However, only a minority of them actually evaluate the performance in the ac-
tual online setting. The works in [54, 69, 85, 123] implemented the DPI in a HIL testbed to
run the evaluations with limited fault and attack conditions. Only one study explored real-
time classification over a wide array of scenarios [123]. In practice, online performance
is critical to the success of security monitoring, especially for the smart grid where a long
time-to-detection may result in a failed remedial effort on the physical side. The ability
to adapt when changes occur in the system will also be critical in the online environment,
as both the system dynamics and threat models may change over time and result in a de-
graded performance. Considering the affordability and availability of field test sites, HIL
co-simulation testbeds [153] and digital twins [154] may provide the most cost-effective
online platform for research and development of DPI-based security monitoring.
Advanced Data-driven Techniques
Another aspect that has attracted growing attention but was not fully addressed is the ma-
chine learning and deep learning algorithms for DPI approaches. Deep learning is a rel-
atively new field that has been proven to be effective in many challenging tasks; the high
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dimensionality and complexity of smart grid data make deep learning a promising, cus-
tomizable solution for advanced DPI solutions. However, the explainability and trustwor-
thiness of deep learning in security decision-making and safety-critical applications remain
to be fully demonstrated.
Hybrid DPI Techniques
While rule-based and data-driven techniques have been widely investigated, few have been
combined to offer a multifaceted attack detector/classifier with rules defined by human
experts and learned from machine intelligence. The rule-based techniques are suitable
to simpler protocols like Modbus and DNP3, where normal and attack behaviors can be
accurately modeled using rules; the machine learning techniques are highly effective for
measurements over SV or IEEE C37.118 protocols because of the complexity and uncer-
tainty of the physical system reflected in the measurements. A hybrid DPI may retain
the accuracy from existing knowledge and the adaptability for incoming variants, combing
the best from both sides for better context-aware security monitoring. As an example, to
monitor the full behavior of the IEEE C37.118 protocol, all of the four frame types may
be examined. The configuration, command, and header frames will demonstrate relatively
simple behaviors over a small number of packets; subsequently, a set of rules may be able
to characterize the normal behavior of packets and specify potential attack signatures. On
the other hand, the data frame of the IEEE C37.118 protocol carries physical measure-
ments of the power system; these data points may be impossible to model with simple rules




Finally, we identify the lack of combined classification-detection techniques that can ac-
curately classify previously seen instances and flag zero-day behavior. Among the re-
viewed works, only two studies performed anomaly detection and classification simulta-
neously [91, 96], while the rest are investigating classification and anomaly detection sep-
arately. A hierarchical design or a collaborative pipeline may combine both detection and



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Acronyms of Simulated Scenarios
Scenario Acronym
Single/Double Relay Trip Command Injection CI
Fault Replay FR
Single Relay Disabled Fault Attack RD
Single/Double Relay Disabled Line Maintenance Attack LMA
Double Relay Disabled with 1LG Fault Attack 1LF
Aurora Attack AA
Denial of Service DoS
Physical Trip of Relay at Faceplate PT
Data Injection DI
Breaker Failure BF
1/2/3 Line Ground Fault (LGF) LGF
Line to Line Fault LL
Line Maintenance LMF
Over current fault OCF




In this chapter we detail the experimental framework that covers the developed benchmark
power models used in the HIL co-simulation testbed, along with the communication pro-
tocols and tools used in the real-time simulation of the power system. Furthermore, we
present the extracted features used, the threat model, and the implemented anomaly detec-
tion algorithms.
4.1 Hardware-in-the-Loop Co-simulation Testbed Setup
The WAMS co-simulation testbed is made of two parts: the real-time power model simula-
tor and the communication network that connects the power model simulator with physical
and virtual IEDs found in the network. The simulated model includes simulated equip-
ment such as PMUs and PDCs that can send and receive messages over the network to
communicate with Virtual Machines (VMs) and other IEDs. As a result, the information
generated by the power model simulator can be shared with other devices deployed on the
communication network for further analysis. Fig. 8 shows a high-level view of the WAMS
co-simulation testbed.
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Figure 8: WAMS Co-simulation Testbed
4.1.1 Power Model
In this thesis, we develop the electric power models using Hypersim DRTS [155] developed
by OPAL-RT Technologies. Hypersim DRTS can integrate HIL and different SG-specific
communication protocols into the real-time simulation of the power grid, allowing real
IEDs to act as part the power model simulation. Hypersim constructs electrical power sys-
tem models using modular components that include simulated power generation sources,
line equipment, control functions, control signals, and input and output nodes for commu-
nication with real IEDs connected to the simulation. These features of Hypersim provide
the ability to monitor the operation of the power system under different conditions i.e. in-
stabilities, faults, etc. Furthermore, Hypersim provides simulated real-time power system
measurements like voltage, current and frequency. To achieve a co-simulation framework,
power systems simulated in Hypersim can send and receive messages using SG-specific
communication protocols over communication networks connected to the simulator. This
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allows the integration of real IEDs into the simulation that can exchange information and
possibly impact the behavior of the simulated system. In this chapter, we construct two
real-time transmission power models using Hypersim: IEEE 9-bus system and IEEE 39-
bus system. The capabilities provided by Hypersim render it appropriate to evaluate the
performance of DPI-based detection schemes against cyber-physical attacks in WAMS.
Details on the constructed testbed are provided in the subsequent sections.
IEEE 9-bus System
The IEEE 9-bus system, also known as the P.M. Anderson 9 bus system, represents an
approximation of the Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system. It comprises
9 buses, 3 generators, 3 power transformers, 6 lines and 3 loads. The base voltage levels
are 13.8 kV, 16.5 kV, 18 kV, and 230 kV and the line capacities are between 100 and 150
MVA [156]. The active power of the loads ranges from 90 MW to 125 MW, and the reactive
power ranges from 30 to 50 MVar. A single line diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 9
Figure 9: IEEE 9-bus System
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IEEE 39-bus System
The IEEE 39-bus system, also known as the 10-machine New-England Power System,
contains 39 buses, 32 transmission lines, 24 transformers, 10 generators and 19 loads. The
complete system parameters are presented in [157]. A single line diagram of the system is
shown in Fig. 10
Figure 10: IEEE 39-bus System
4.1.2 Communication Model
We implement a communication network in the testbed in order to facilitate the transmis-
sion of digital messages carrying commands and physical measurements within the WAMS
simulation. The communication network is a local IP network with configurable routing.
Since we simulate different cyberattacks compromising the communication channels in this
research work, having such an insulated and controllable network allows us to safely run
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cyberattack experiments without the risk of damaging publicly accessible devices and com-
munication channels. We employ a server with an IP communication network to connect
the Hypersim simulator with VMs, and real IEDs. VMs are deployed within the network
and are used to collect and analyze packets in real-time. On the other hand, the Hyper-
sim simulator uses built-in network interfaces to connect to the communication network.
A physical switch connects the IP network and the Hypersim simulator through which
they communicate. The communication network used in the testbed is built using Open-
Stack [158]. OpenStack is a software networking tool that provides the means to create
and manage IP communication networks. It can create VMs and virtual network switches
within the network, and configure communication channels between different machines,
routers, and switches. The virtual switches allow subnetting of the VMs into different
subnets with access to each subnet regulated by routing and firewall rules. In this work,
we choose to use OpenStack to setup the communication network because it can easily
integrate Hypersim into the IP network, create VMs that contain custom code for data col-
lection and analysis, and configure access to different subnets. It is mandatory to integrate
Hypersim into the IP network in order transport the physical measurements generated by
the transmission power model to the WAMS applications and attack detection models in
real-time. To perform traffic monitoring and launch cyberattacks, network bridges between
different subnets are set up. These bridges contain custom code that captures and modifies
packets coming from PMUs to PDCs on the fly and forwards them to other VMs that an-
alyze the packet contents. This monitoring setup allows us to launch online cyberattacks,
analyze their impact, and detect them in real-time.
4.1.3 Simulated Scenarios
In our experiments, we consider multiple scenarios as normal in our training set, and we
use data from all of them to train our anomaly detection models. We use a load flow to
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simulate the normal behavior of the system over 24 hours as shown in Table 4 for the
9-bus system. This step is a very important aspect of our research because simulating the
power model with varying loads over time renders our experiments more realistic. As such,
they would resemble the behavior of real power models where loads are always changing.
Furthermore, physical measurements under constant loads will show very little variation,
rendering any change in their values very obvious thus not requiring advanced detection
methods to spot attacks. Fig. 11 shows the voltage variation as the load varies over 24
hours, as measured by the PMU placed on bus 6 of the IEEE 9-bus system, under different
conditions that include an increase of 50% of the load for a certain period of time, an
increase in a generator’s voltage and a decrease in a generator’s voltage at different times
of the day. Similarly, Fig. 12 shows the voltage variation as the load varies over 24 hours in
the IEEE 39-bus system under normal conditions, an increase of 50% of the load, increase
in a generator’s voltage and a decrease in a generator’s voltage at different times of the day.
We collect the data of these scenarios and feed it to the anomaly detection algorithms for
training. We include multiple variations of scenarios in our training set in order to depict
the dynamic nature of the smart grid where we can see different, fast-changing behaviors
that correspond to a safe state but are nevertheless very distinct.
4.1.4 Optimal PMU Placement
PMUs are becoming more and more an integral tool for monitoring and control in the SG.
They provide instantaneous, time-aligned voltage, current and frequency measurements at
the buses and lines connected to them. However, PMUs are expensive and require a dense
communication infrastructure to deploy, which can increase the attack surface. Therefore,
it is inadvisable and sometimes impossible to place PMUs at all buses of the grid for mon-
itoring purposes. Subsequently, it is necessary to find the minimum number of PMUs that
can provide full system observability to the control center. The Optimal PMU Placement
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Table 4: IEEE 9-bus System Load Variation Over Time
Hour Load 1 MW Load 2 MW Load 3 MW Load 1 MVAR Load 2 MVAR Load 3 MVAR
0 67.2 84.1 60.5 23.5 33.6 20.2
1 62.6 78.3 56.4 21.9 31.3 18.8
2 59.8 74.8 53.9 20.9 29.9 18
3 58.1 72.6 52.3 20.3 29 17.4
4 57.7 72.1 51.9 20.2 28.9 17.3
5 59.1 73.8 53.1 20.7 29.5 17.7
6 63 78.8 56.7 22.1 31.5 18.9
7 71.2 89.1 64.1 24.9 35.6 21.4
8 78.5 98.2 70.7 27.5 39.3 23.6
9 84.6 105.7 76.1 29.6 42.3 25.4
10 90 112.5 81 31.5 45 27
11 93.6 117 84.3 32.8 46.8 28.1
12 96.2 120.3 86.6 33.7 48.1 28.9
13 98.5 123.1 88.7 34.5 49.3 29.6
14 99.3 124.1 89.4 34.8 49.7 29.8
15 100 125 90 35 50 30
16 99.7 124.7 89.8 34.9 49.9 29.9
17 99.9 124.9 89.9 35 50 30
18 99.4 124.2 89.4 34.8 49.7 29.8
19 97.2 121.5 87.5 34 48.6 29.2
20 93.5 116.8 84.1 32.7 46.7 28
21 91.8 114.7 82.6 32.1 45.9 27.5
22 85.9 107.4 77.3 30.1 43 25.8
23 77.7 97.1 69.9 27.2 38.8 23.3
Figure 11: Load Variation in IEEE 9-bus System
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Figure 12: Load Variation in IEEE 39-bus System
Table 5: Optimal Locations of PMUs for the IEEE 9-bus and IEEE 39-bus Systems
Test System Minimum Number of PMUs PMU Locations (Bus)
IEEE 9-Bus 3 5,6,8
IEEE 39-Bus 13 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 29
(OPP) problem tackles this issue and aims to find the minimal suitable set of locations
where PMUs can be installed in order to ensure system observability. In this research
work, we choose not to collect the physical measurements from all possible buses, rather
we opt to install a restricted number of PMUs on select buses only, in order to ensure a
realistic setup. This approach aligns with real deployments of the smart grid previously
outlined. The buses that hold PMUs are selected by solving the optimal PMU placement
problem [159] that ensures system observability. The PMU locations for the 9-bus and
39-bus systems are taken from [160] and [161] respectively and are shown in Table 5.
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4.2 Feature Extraction
Before training the anomaly detection models, feature extraction is necessary. This is a
vital task in this research work because it can have an immense impact on the final result
of the approach. In this chapter, we focus on applying anomaly detection algorithms on
DPI-based features. Subsequently the features we use as input to these algorithms are
extracted from the payloads of the IEEE C37.118 packets sent over the communication
network. More specifically, the features we extract are the physical measurements collected
by PMUs in the field and forwarded to the control center. These features include voltage
phasors at the bus where PMUs are installed, current phasors for each line connected to
the bus, frequency and ROCOF. After extracting the features, we perform 2 preprocessing
steps: data cleaning and feature scaling. In data cleaning, we remove the instances that
only have zeros for all the features. These correspond to dropped packets which happens
occasionally over the network. Furthermore, we simulate each scenario for a specific time
period beyond which the loads become constant at a generic value thus we extract all the
instances that correspond to the simulated scenario by disregarding from the dataset all data
collected before starting the simulation of the scenario and after the end of the simulation.
All collected features are continuous variables that vary in different ranges. For example,
voltage magnitude features vary between 120,000 and 150,000 while voltage phase angles
oscillate between -180 and +180. Other features such as frequency show less variability,
keeping a value close to 60 with small variations over time. In order to ensure optimal
performance of the proposed models, we choose to scale our input data features to the range
of [0, 1]. We do so because having features with different scales can mislead the learning
algorithms, since features with larger scales can have a bigger influence on the outcome
than those with smaller ranges, and this can lead to unsatisfactory detection results. To





where Xoriginal is the raw measurement collected from the packet, Xmin is the smallest
value for a particular feature, and Xmax is the largest value for a particular feature. Apply-
ing this transformation for each feature in the dataset individually will result in changing
the range of all the features to [0, 1].
Finally, the resulting feature vector coming from the 3 PMUs deployed in the 9-bus
system is composed of 78 features collected and the feature vector of the 39-bus has 356
features collected from 13 PMUs.
4.3 Threat Model
WAMS and their applications play a vital role in securing and ensuring the stability of the
electrical grid as shown by the reliance on these indices by grid operators when taking
control decisions. Subsequently, attackers looking to cause significant harm to the grid
find that targeting the measurements reported to these applications is very appealing. By
altering the measurements, along with a sufficient knowledge of the grid, the attacker can
portray a different scenario to the operator that might trigger unnecessary, harmful control
actions, or hide real instabilities in the grid. For example, attacks on PAM by tampering
the reported phase angles can lead to an increase in cost, power loss, and transmission line
tripping. Also attacks on FVSI by modifying the reported voltage phasors can lead to load
shedding, and blackouts. Furthermore, hiding an increase in the value of these indices can
lead to equipment damage, blackouts, etc. because the operator would not notice any insta-
bility and subsequently would fail to issue commands to bring the grid back to its normal
operation.
In addition, the WAMS-specific protocols do not offer the necessary security features to
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stop such attacks. IEEE C37.118 is the most widely used protocol currently, and it lacks
confidentiality and robust integrity features since it only offers CRC error checking. A
knowledgeable attacker can modify the measurements in the packet and recalculate the
CRC field, bypassing future integrity verifications. IEC 61850-90-5 was introduced with
added security features to address these shortcomings. It proposes the establishment of a
key distribution center to share and periodically refresh secret keys among different IEDs
for symmetric encryption and signature schemes. The proposed features enhance the secu-
rity of the communications but attackers with sufficient capabilities can still bypass them
and execute their attack successfully.
Fig. 13 shows the attack tree for successfully tampering with the reported measurements.
The attacker has 2 paths to achieve his goal: attacking the communication network or at-
tacking the PMUs directly. By gaining access to the communication network and establish-
ing a MITM, the attacker can modify the measurements and the corresponding CRC while
they are being transported over the network. However, the security measures introduced by
IEC 61850-90-5 can stop such an attack because the attacker needs the secret encryption
key to decrypt and sign the content of the packet. The second branch of the attack tree
depicts a direct attack on the PMUs in the field. This is possible via installing a malware
on the PMU, or by physically connecting to it and gaining access, which is a reasonable
assumption given that these devices are often deployed in remote, unattended locations or
in the case of an insider attack. In this scenario, both protocols are unable to deter the
attacker because the integrity and confidentiality features implemented are compromised
since the attacker controls the device and the keys stored on it. Thus, the currently used
protocols are still vulnerable to stealthy FDI attacks that can lead to severe consequences
for the smart grid.
In this research, we study 6 different stealthy FDI attacks. First we investigate attacks tar-
geting the PAM, FVSI, and ISI applications where the attacker manipulates the reported
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measurements in order to portray an instability through the attacked application. Second,
we investigate masking attacks whereby the attacker manipulates the reported measure-
ments in a manner that portrays a normal operation of the grid while one of the applica-
tions is indicating an instability. Thus the term masking suggests that the attacker tries to
hide/mask the instabilities from the controller.
4.4 Deep Autoencoders
Autoencoders are a subdivision of neural networks that are trained to predict the input they
are given. In order to do so, an autoencoder has 3 main components: encoder, decoder
and a bottleneck layer that separates the encoder and the decoder. The architecture of an
autoencoder is symmetrical with respect to the bottleneck layer, that is there are the same
number of hidden layers in the encoder and the decoder and the same number of neurons in
each layer. And since the network is trained to predict the input, both the input and output
layers have the same number of neurons. The encoder takes the input x and compresses
it, using a smaller number of neurons, to get a representation of the initial feature vector y
such that
y = φ(x) = σ(Wx+ b) (8)
where σ() is the activation function used, W is the weight matrix and b is the bias vector of
the encoder.
The compressed representation of the input layer y is known as the bottleneck layer.
The decoder is trained to take the information in the bottleneck layer and reproduce the
input layer using the information condensed in the bottleneck [162].






























Figure 13: FDI Attack Tree
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where σˆ() is the activation function used, Wˆ is the weight matrix and c is the bias vector
of the decoder. Parameters W, b, Wˆ and c are regulated during training in order to find a set
that minimizes the reconstruction error such that
φ, ψ = argmin
φ,ψ
L(x, xˆ) (10)
where L(x, xˆ) is the reconstruction error. The smaller the reconstruction error, the
better the performance of the autoencoder network. To test if an instance is anomalous, we
check if its reconstruction error is greater than a set threshold. If so, the instance is flagged
as anomalous. Fig. 14 shows an overview of the architecture of an autoencoder.
Figure 14: Deep Autoencoder
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4.5 Windowed Deep Autoencoders
Windowed-Deep Autoencoders (w-DAE) are a variation of DAE neural networks that in-
corporate temporal information inherent in time-series data. w-DAE have a similar struc-
ture to DAE whereby they are comprised of 3 components: encoder, decoder, and the
bottleneck layer that divides the network symmetrically with respect to the number of hid-
den layers and the number of neurons in each layers. However, they differ from traditional
DAE in that they are not trained to reconstruct the input at their output layer. Rather, w-
DAE takes a window of consecutive samples as input and attempts to reconstruct the last
sample of the window in the output layer with the smallest reconstruction error possible.
w-DAE employs a sliding-window that covers n samples, the encoder takes this input xn
and compresses it to get a representation of the time window yn such that
yn = φ(xn) = σ(Wxn + b) (11)
where σ() is the activation function used, W is the weight matrix and b is the bias vector of
the encoder.
The decoder takes the bottleneck layer and is trained to reconstruct the last sample of
the sliding-window such that
xˆi = ψ(yn) = σˆ(Wˆyn + c) (12)
where xˆi is the prediction of the last sample of the sliding window, σˆ() is the activation
function used, Wˆ is the weight matrix and c is the bias vector of the decoder. Parame-
ters W, b, Wˆ and c are regulated during training in order to find a set that minimizes the
reconstruction error such that




where L(x, xˆ) is the reconstruction error. Similarly to DAE, an instance is considered
an anomaly if its reconstruction error is higher than the set threshold. Fig. 15 shows an
overview of the architecture of a windowed-autoencoder.
Figure 15: Windowed Deep Autoencoder
4.6 Long Short-Term Memory
RNNs [163] are a subdivision of neural networks that specialize in processing sequential
data i.e. they base their prediction on a sequence of consecutive past events. They differ
from traditional neural networks in that they handle time-series variables x0, x1 ... xt−1, xt.
RNN predict the hidden states using the following formula:
h(t) = f(h(t− 1), x(t)) (14)
where h represents the state, h(t-1) represents the past states, and x(t) represents the input at
time t. At each time step, RNNs take input x(t) and compute a new state h(t) by concate-
nating the previous state h(t−1) with the input, applying a linear map to the concatenation,
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and passing the result through a logistic Sigmoid function.
However, RNNs face serious limitations when handling long-rage sequences because
of the repeated application of Sigmoid functions that causes a large decay in the error signal
over time [164]. This problem is termed as the vanishing gradient problem.
LSTM neural networks [165] are a subdivision of RNNs designed to overcome the
shortcomings of traditional RNNs, most notably the vanishing gradient problem. LSTM
has an additional memory cell ct which is a linear combination of the previous state and
the input. In addition, LSTMs have 3 multiplicative gates that regulate the proportion of
the input that is passed to the memory cell it, and the proportion of the previous memory
cell to ignore ft. The memory cell value for input xt is computed as:
it = σ(Wixxt +Wihht−1 +Wicct−1 + bi) (15)
ft = σ(Wfxxt +Wfhht−1 +Wfcct−1 + bf ) (16)
ct = ft ⊗ ct−1 + it ⊗ tanh(Wcxxt +Wchht−1 + bc) (17)
where σ is the component-wise logistic Sigmoid function, and⊗ is the component-wise
Hadamard product.
Finally, the current state ht at each time step is governed by the third gate ot that is
calculated by:
ot = σ(Woxxt +Wohht−1 +Wocct−1 + bo) (18)
ht = ot ⊗ tanh(ct) (19)
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Fig. 16 shows an LSTM cell adapted from [166].
Figure 16: Structure of LSTM Cell
4.7 One-Class SVM
SVM is a supervised learning technique that separates the data instances by a hyperplane
or a set of hyperplanes. The hyperplane is constructed in a way that provides the greatest
margin of separation among the classes of the data. The margin is the sum of the shortest
distances from the nearest data point of each class to the hyperplane. This design of the
hyperplane, that underlines the differences between the categories, helps the model gener-
alize better when classifying unseen data, thus doing so correctly. Equation 20 shows how
the margin is calculated in order to construct the optimal hyperplane:





where β0 is the bias term, x is the new instance, xi is an instance from the training set, and
αi with i = 1, ...n are the set parameters.
In addition, SVM is effective in handling nonlinearly separable datasets because it maps
the data points (which are represented by vectors), from the input space to a higher dimen-
sional feature space where they become linearly separable. This is done by using a kernel
function that takes two vectors from the input space and projects the resulting vector to the
feature space. Some popular kernel functions are polynomial kernel, radial basis function
kernel and sigmoid kernel [167].
OC-SVM is a version of SVM that is used for unsupervised learning. OC-SVM trains
on one class label only and it aims to find a boundary that separates the instances of that one
class from everything else. Thus it is considered an anomaly detection technique because
it separates instances belonging to the only class it was trained on, from all other instances
which will be considered abnormal with respect to the learned class. Fig. 17 shows a two
dimensional example of anomaly detection using OC-SVM.
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Figure 17: Two Dimensional Representation of OC-SVM [1]
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results and Analysis
In this chapter, we explain the experimental setup used and we give details regarding the
datasets collected from our testbed. Furthermore, we explain the evaluation metrics used to
validate the anomaly detection methods and we present the results of the anomaly detection
techniques tested on the 6 FDI scenarios we implemented. Finally, we end this chapter with
an analysis of the experimental results.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We develop a HIL testbed to simulate the real-time behaviour of the power grid. We focus
on having different hardware coming from actual vendors, and a real-time aspect to our
experiments in order to have a simulation that is as close to real world smart grid operations
as possible. We implement our power model in Hypersim [155], the physical measurements
in the simulation are transported using the IEEE C37.118 protocol [19] over a network
emulated using OpenStack [158], where they are ultimately captured and decoded using
Wireshark [168] before further analysis.
We train our anomaly detection models on a dedicated server with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz, 300 GB RAM, and Nvidia Titan X GPU. The implementation of
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WAMS applications, and the anomaly detection models is done using Python programming
language [169]. In addition we use Elasticsearch [170] as a database for data analytics.
Kibana [171] is used in addition to Elasticsearch for visualization on the dashboard.
5.1.1 Datasets
The training, validation, and testing datasets collected from the testbed have the same size
for both the IEEE 9-bus system and the IEEE 39-bus system. The training dataset is made
up of 35,000 normal samples and the validation set is made up of 24,000 samples. The
testing dataset is imbalanced with 75% normal and 25% attack, because of the difficulty of
collection of FDI attack instances in realistic setups. Furthermore, we take into considera-
tion different attack capabilities by testing the performance of the techniques for different
number of PMUs attacked ranging from just 1 attacked PMU to all possible compromised
PMUs. As explained in Section 4.2, the features extracted include voltage, current, fre-
quency and ROCOF measurements collected by the PMUs. These measurements are pre-
processed and normalized to the range of [0, 1] to account to the different magnitudes and
avoid misleading the training algorithms. Figures 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the raw voltage,
current, frequency and ROCOF measurements respectively, collected from a PMU. From
the figures we can see that the variability of the values of these features differs, for ex-
amples, the values of frequency are mainly constricted in the range of 60 as opposed to
voltage where the values vary between 136,000 and 139,000 volts over time. Moreover,
figures show that the relation between certain features is visible whereas other features
don’t show such characteristic. For example, we see that current increases when voltage
decreases and vice versa, however we don’t see such a relation between voltage and fre-
quency. Similarly, Figures 22, 23, 24 and 25 show the corresponding normalized voltage,
current, frequency and ROCOF measurements from the same PMU.
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Figure 18: Raw Voltage Measurements
Figure 19: Raw Current Measurements
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Figure 20: Raw Frequency Measurements
Figure 21: Raw ROCOF Measurements
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Figure 22: Scaled Voltage Measurements
Figure 23: Scaled Current Measurements
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Figure 24: Scaled Frequency Measurements
Figure 25: Scaled ROCOF Measurements
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To further explore these relationships, we plot the correlation matrix of these features.
Fig. 26 shows the correlation matrix of measurements collected from the same PMU.
We see that there is a strong correlation between measurements coming from same PMU
like voltage and current where the correlation measure reaches about -0.75. This shows a
strong negative relationship between the 2 measurements, which means that these features
vary inversely consistently. On the other hand, we notice a correlation measure close to
0 between voltage and frequency which asserts that these features don’t exhibit a strong
relationship.
Figure 26: Correlation Matrix of PMU 9 Measurements
Furthermore, we investigate the correlation of measurements coming from different
PMUs in the same system. Fig. 27 shows the correlation of measurements between 2
PMUs in the 9-bus system. We notice that there are also correlations between measure-
ments coming from different PMUs. Voltage measurements coming from different PMUs
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show a strong positive correlation among themselves and voltage and current measurements
exhibit a strong negative correlation. Furthermore we notice that there is a weak correlation
between voltage and frequency coming from different PMUs.
Figure 27: Correlation Matrix of PMU 9 and PMU 10 Measurements
5.2 Parameter Tuning
Hyperparameters play an important role when developing machine learning algorithms.
They are the parameters that govern the training process of the algorithm. Usually, ma-
chine learning algorithms depend on multiple hyperparamteres that need to be tuned in
order to achieve optimal results. In this work, we perform hyperparameter tuning on the
tested techniques in order to find the set of hyperparamters that results in the best outcome.
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Next, we will showcase the hyperparameter tuning process and present the set of hyper-
paramters chosen for each used method. We test the DAE with 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15
hidden layers, and for different activation functions that include Tanh, Sigmoid, Relu, Elu,
Softsign, Linear, and Selu functions. Finally, we pick the architecture-activation function
combination that performs best on the validation set. The same process is followed for the
other algorithms. First we train a DAE with one hidden layer with the different activation
function. Fig. 28 shows the reconstruction error for the different activation functions. Fig.
29 shows the log of the error in order to get a clearer view of the results.
Figure 28: Reconstruction Error of Different Functions with 1 Hidden Layer
We then train a DAE with 5, 11, and 15 hidden layer with the different activation func-
tion. Figures 30, 31 and 32 shows the log of the reconstruction error for the different
architectures respectively.
From the previous experiments Tanh, Selu, and Elu functions have consistently outper-
formed the rest of the other activation functions and have showed similar reconstruction
errors. To choose between them we compare the run time for each activation function
for different network architectures. Fig. 33 shows a comparison of the run-time of the 3
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Figure 29: Log (Reconstruction Error) of Different Functions with 1 Hidden Layer
Figure 30: Log (Reconstruction Error) of Different Functions with 5 Hidden Layers
activation functions for different network architectures.
Based on the previous experiments we conclude that Tanh, Selu, and Elu activation
functions have similar performance and that Tanh is faster than Selu and Elu across different
network architectures
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Figure 31: Log (Reconstruction Error) of Different Functions with 11 Hidden Layers
Figure 32: Log (Reconstruction Error) of Different Functions with 15 Hidden Layers
Next, we test the Tanh function with more network architectures. Fig. 34 shows the
result of this experiment.
From Fig. 34 we see that the performance doesn’t ameliorate by going from 11 to 13
or 15 hidden layers (~2.5e-04). To choose between them we compare the run time of Tanh
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Figure 33: Run Time for Different Network Architectures
Figure 34: Reconstruction Error with Different Number of Hidden Layers
for 11, 13, and 15 hidden layers. Fig. 35 shows the result of this time comparison.
Finally, based on all the previous experiments, the best parameter combination for DAE
is 11 hidden layers with Tanh activation function since it balances between performance and
running time.
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Figure 35: Run Time for Different Network Architectures
The same process is repeated for the other techniques to reach the optimal set of hy-
perparamaters. Table 6 shows the hyperparamaters of the implemented DAE, w-DAE and
LSTM models. Table 7 shows the hyperparamaters of the implemented OC-SVM models
Table 6: Hyperparameters of DAE, w-DAE, and LSTM models
Model Hidden Layers Activation Function Optimizer
9-bus DAE 11 Tanh Adam
9-bus w-DAE 11 Tanh Adam
39-bus DAE 11 Tanh Adam
39-bus w-DAE 13 Tanh Adam
9-bus LSTM 4 Tanh Adam
39-bus LSTM 8 Tanh Adam
Table 7: Hyperparameters of OC-SVM models
Model Kernel Gamma Nu
9-bus OC-SVM RBF 0.1 0.01
39-bus OC-SVM RBF 0.1 0.01
94
5.2.1 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the performance of detection techniques, a confusion matrix is calculated. A
confusion matrix is a table that summarizes the prediction results of a technique. Confusion
matrices generally have two rows and two columns: the columns represent the actual class
and the rows represent the predicted class. Furthermore, they portray the total number of
errors made by the model, and it highlights the types of the made errors. Table 8 shows an
example of a confusion matrix.









Four counts are calculated in a confusion matrix: True positive (TP), true negative (TN),
false positive (FP) and false negative (FN):
• TP indicates when an instance is positive and it is predicted to be positive.
• TN indicates when an instance is negative and it is predicted to be negative.
• FP indicates when an instance is negative and it is predicted to be positive.
• FN indicates when an instance is positive and it is predicted to be negative.
Different evaluation metrics can be derived from a confusion matrix. In this research
work, we evaluate the performance of our proposed techniques using 4 metrics: Accuracy,
False Positive Rate, False Negative Rate, and F1. These metrics defined next.
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Accuracy
Accuracy is calculated by dividing the number of correct predictions over the total number
of predictions as defined in Equation 21. Accuracy gives the same weight to both FPs and
FNs which can mislead the interpretation of the result. This is especially important in cases
of unbalanced datasets where one class occurs significantly more than the other because
errors in the minority class might get overshadowed by the majority class.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(21)
False Positive Rate
FPR is calculated by dividing the number of false positives over all the negative cases in







FNR is calculated by dividing the number of false negatives over all the positive cases in







F1 is the weighted average of recall and precision. F1 takes into account both FPs and
FNs while giving them different weights as opposed to accuracy where both errors have
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the same weight. In order to calculate F1, precision and recall should be calculated first.
Precision is the number of TPs divided by all the predicted positive cases as defined in






Recall is the number of TPs divided by all the actual positive cases as defined in Equa-





Finally, F1 is calculated using equation 26
F 1 =




In this section, we will discuss each attack individually, we will show the WAMS applica-
tion index under normal conditions and under FDI attack, and finally we will present the
detection results for different number of compromised PMUs.
5.3.1 IEEE 9-bus System
In this section we discuss the attacks and detection results for all the tested models in the
IEEE 9-bus system. In the tables we present all 4 metrics for the different number of
compromised PMUs. Table 9 presents the results for the FDI attacks on the IEEE 9-bus
applications, and Table 10 presents the results for the masking attacks in the IEEE 9-bus
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system. Next we detail attacks on each application with figures showing their impact and
the detection results.
Attack on PAM
The stealthy FDI attack on the PAM application in the 9-bus system targets line 2. Fig. 36a
shows the PAM index of line 2 under normal conditions and Fig. 36b shows the same
index under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually increase the
perceived transferred power by 2 MW. Fig. 37 presents the performance, evaluated using
the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
Figure 36: PAM Experiment on Line 2 of IEEE 9-bus System
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Figure 37: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Attack on FVSI
The stealthy FDI attack on the FVSI application in the 9-bus system targets line 4. Fig. 38a
shows the FVSI index of line 4 under normal conditions and Fig. 38b shows the same
index under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually increase the
perceived FVSI until it reaches a critical value (0.8). Fig. 39 presents the performance,
evaluated using the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting
this attack.
99
Figure 38: FVSI Experiment on Line 4 of IEEE 9-bus System
Figure 39: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Attack on ISI
The stealthy FDI attack on the ISI application in the 9-bus system targets bus 6. Fig. 40a
shows the ISI index of bus 6 under normal conditions and Fig. 40b shows the same index
under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually decrease the per-
ceived ISI until it reaches a critical value (0.2). Fig. 41 presents the performance, evaluated
using the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
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Figure 40: ISI Experiment on Bus 6 of IEEE 9-bus System
Figure 41: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Masking Attack on PAM
In the masking FDI attack against PAM in the 9-bus system, the attacker hides an instability
on line 2 where the transferred power increases by 2 MW. When the attacker notices this
instability in the system, he starts modifying the reported measurements to display normal
operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the opposite of the
previous attack on the PAM application. Fig. 42 presents the F1 performance of the studied
anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
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Figure 42: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Masking attack on FVSI
In the masking FDI attack against FVSI in the 9-bus system, the attacker hides an instability
on line 4 where the index increase to 0.8. When the attacker notices this instability in
the system, he starts gradually modifying the reported measurements to display normal
operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the opposite of the
previous attack on the FVSI application. Fig. 43 presents the performance, evaluated using
the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
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Figure 43: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Masking attack on ISI
In the masking FDI attack against ISI in the 9-bus system, the attacker hides an instability
on bus 6 where the index decreases to 0.2. When the attacker notices this instability in
the system, he starts gradually modifying the reported measurements to display normal
operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the opposite of the
previous attack on the ISI application. Fig. 44 presents the performance, evaluated using
the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
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Figure 44: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Table 9: Detection Results for FDI Against Applications in the IEEE 9-bus System.
PAM FVSI ISI
Metrics # of CompromisedPMUs w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM
Accuracy
1 0.986 0.973 0.922 0.886 0.997 0.997 0.992 0.922 0.971 0.961 0.929 0.848
2 0.975 0.97 0.947 0.824 0.997 0.997 0.989 0.922 0.973 0.966 0.938 0.849
3 0.732 0.734 0.734 0.731 0.632 0.634 0.634 0.557 0.362 0.365 0.364 0.346
F1
1 0.974 0.947 0.831 0.734 0.996 0.995 0.989 0.904 0.976 0.968 0.941 0.869
2 0.95 0.941 0.891 0.524 0.996 0.996 0.985 0.904 0.978 0.973 0.949 0.8708
3 0.013 0.001 0.015 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.01 0 0.003 0 0.008 0.0121
FPR
1 0.001 0.0006 0.004 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0082 0.0614
2 0.001 0.0006 0.0042 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0082 0.0614
3 0.001 0.0006 0.0016 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0009 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0049 0.0614
FNR
1 0.0477 0.0995 0.2808 0.4063 0.0084 0.0088 0.0161 0.00321 0.0457 0.0611 0.107 0.2032
2 0.0922 0.1106 0.1874 0.6368 0.0068 0.0072 0.0225 0.00321 0.0427 0.0529 0.0929 0.20143
3 0.9934 0.9994 0.9923 0.9889 0.9972 0.9996 0.9952 1 0.9984 0.9998 0.9958 0.9936
Table 10: Detection Results for Masking FDI Attacks in the IEEE 9-bus System.
PAM FVSI ISI
Metrics # of CompromisedPMUs w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM
Accuracy
1 0.986 0.973 0.922 0.886 0.997 0.997 0.992 0.922 0.971 0.961 0.929 0.848
2 0.975 0.97 0.947 0.824 0.997 0.997 0.989 0.922 0.973 0.966 0.938 0.849
3 0.732 0.734 0.734 0.731 0.632 0.634 0.634 0.557 0.362 0.365 0.364 0.346
F1
1 0.974 0.947 0.831 0.734 0.996 0.995 0.989 0.904 0.976 0.968 0.941 0.869
2 0.95 0.941 0.891 0.524 0.996 0.996 0.985 0.904 0.978 0.973 0.949 0.8708
3 0.013 0.001 0.015 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.01 0 0.003 0 0.008 0.0121
FPR
1 0.001 0.0006 0.004 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0082 0.0614
2 0.001 0.0006 0.0042 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0082 0.0614
3 0.001 0.0006 0.0016 0.0086 0.0002 0.0002 0.0009 0.1197 0.0004 0.0004 0.0049 0.0614
FNR
1 0.0477 0.0995 0.2808 0.4063 0.0084 0.0088 0.0161 0.00321 0.0457 0.0611 0.107 0.203
2 0.0922 0.1106 0.1874 0.6368 0.0068 0.0072 0.0225 0.00321 0.0427 0.0529 0.0929 0.2014
3 0.9934 0.9994 0.9923 0.9889 0.9972 0.9996 0.9952 1 0.9984 0.9998 0.9958 0.9936
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5.3.2 IEEE 39-bus System
In this section we discuss the attacks and detection results for all the tested models in the
IEEE 39-bus system. In the tables we present all 4 metrics for the different number of
compromised PMUs. Table 11 presents the results for the FDI attacks on the IEEE 39-bus
applications, and Table 12 presents the results for the masking attacks in the IEEE 39-bus
system. Next we detail attacks on each application with figures showing their impact and
the detection results.
Attack on PAM
The stealthy FDI attack on the PAM application in the 39-bus system targets line 32.
Fig. 45a shows the PAM index of line 32 under normal conditions and Fig. 45b shows
the same index under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually
increase the perceived transferred power by 1 MW. Fig. 46 presents the performance, eval-
uated using the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this
attack.
Figure 45: PAM Experiment on Line 32 of IEEE 39-bus System
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Figure 46: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Attack on FVSI
The stealthy FDI attack on the FVSI application in the 39-bus system targets line 27.
Fig. 47a shows the FVSI index of line 27 under normal conditions and Fig. 47b shows
the same index under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually
increase the perceived FVSI until it reaches a critical value (0.7). Fig. 48 presents the per-
formance, evaluated using the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in
detecting this attack.
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Figure 47: FVSI Experiment on Line 27 of IEEE 39-bus System
Figure 48: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Attack on ISI
The stealthy FDI attack on the ISI application in the 39-bus system targets bus 20. Fig. 49a
shows the ISI index of bus 20 under normal conditions and Fig. 49b shows the same index
under FDI attack. The attacker modifies the measurements to gradually decrease the per-
ceived ISI until it reaches a critical value (0.3). Fig. 50 presents the performance, evaluated
using the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
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Figure 49: ISI Experiment on Bus 20 of IEEE 39-bus System
Figure 50: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
Masking Attack on PAM
In the masking FDI attack against PAM in the 39-bus system, the attacker hides an instabil-
ity on line 32 where the transferred power increases by 1 MW. When the attacker notices
this instability in the system, he starts gradually modifying the reported measurements to
display normal operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the
opposite of the previous attack on the PAM application. Fig. 51 presents the performance,
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evaluated using the F1 measure, of the anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this at-
tack.
Figure 51: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
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Masking attack on FVSI
In the masking FDI attack against FVSI in the 39-bus system, the attacker hides an insta-
bility on line 27 where the index increase to 0.7. When the attacker notices this instability
in the system, he starts gradually modifying the reported measurements to display normal
operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the opposite of the
previous attack on the FVSI application. Fig. 52 presents the performance, evaluated using
the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
Figure 52: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
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Masking attack on ISI
In the masking FDI attack against ISI in the 39-bus system, the attacker hides an instability
on bus 20 where the index decreases to 0.3. When the attacker notices this instability in
the system, he starts gradually modifying the reported measurements to display normal
operation, thus hiding the instability from the controller. This attack is the opposite of the
previous attack on the ISI application. Fig. 53 presents the performance, evaluated using
the F1 measure, of the studied anomaly detection algorithms in detecting this attack.
Figure 53: F1 for Different Number of Compromised PMUs
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Table 11: Detection Results for FDI Against Applications in the IEEE 39-bus System.
PAM FVSI ISI
Metrics # of CompromisedPMUs w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM
Accuracy
1 0.933 0.935 0.804 0.859 0.999 0.996 0.948 0.995 0.956 0.957 0.928 0.96
2 0.973 0.972 0.846 0.899 0.999 0.999 0.954 0.995 0.981 0.981 0.939 0.974
3 0.989 0.993 0.859 0.922 0.998 0.999 0.962 0.995 0.991 0.988 0.97 0.993
4 0.989 0.993 0.864 0.929 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.971 0.997
5 0.99 0.993 0.876 0.932 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.973 0.997
6 0.99 0.993 0.884 0.935 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.973 0.997
7 0.991 0.993 0.899 0.939 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.974 0.997
8 0.989 0.993 0.909 0.944 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.974 0.997
9 0.988 0.993 0.905 0.947 0.998 0.999 0.961 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.983 0.998
10 0.955 0.993 0.771 0.921 0.998 0.999 0.962 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.982 0.998
11 0.918 0.86 0.742 0.91 0.999 0.999 0.962 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.982 0.998
12 0.779 0.756 0.726 0.899 0.998 0.999 0.962 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.982 0.998
13 0.761 0.761 0.734 0.816 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.998 0.999 0.982 0.998
F1
1 0.837 0.842 0.445 0.595 0.998 0.993 0.921 0.992 0.934 0.936 0.893 0.941
2 0.939 0.938 0.608 0.739 0.998 0.999 0.931 0.992 0.973 0.973 0.911 0.963
3 0.977 0.985 0.676 0.81 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.987 0.983 0.958 0.99
4 0.977 0.985 0.691 0.83 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.997 0.999 0.96 0.996
5 0.978 0.985 0.724 0.838 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.997 0.999 0.962 0.996
6 0.98 0.985 0.747 0.848 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.992 0.997 0.999 0.962 0.996
7 0.981 0.985 0.786 0.858 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.997 0.999 0.963 0.996
8 0.977 0.985 0.811 0.87 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.992 0.997 0.999 0.964 0.996
9 0.975 0.985 0.804 0.879 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.992 0.998 0.999 0.976 0.997
10 0.899 0.985 0.343 0.808 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.998 0.999 0.976 0.997
11 0.8 0.597 0.191 0.776 0.998 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.998 0.999 0.976 0.997
12 0.181 0.001 0.094 0.74 0.997 0.999 0.943 0.993 0.998 0.999 0.976 0.997
13 0.016 0 0.067 0.399 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.997 0.999 0.976 0.997
FPR
1 0.00057 0 0.04563 0.0029 0.00065 0 0.05378 0.00629 0.00161 0.0001 0.02479 0.00343
2 0.00057 0 0.04563 0.0029 0.00065 0 0.05378 0.00629 0.00252 0.0001 0.02479 0.00343
3 0.00059 0 0.05709 0.0029 0.00131 0 0.0553 0.00629 0.00252 0.0001 0.02479 0.00343
4 0.00059 0 0.05709 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.0023 0.0001 0.02479 0.00343
5 0.00059 0 0.05729 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.0023 0.0001 0.02502 0.00343
6 0.00059 0 0.05729 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.0023 0.0001 0.02502 0.00343
7 0.00059 0 0.05729 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.0023 0.0001 0.02502 0.00343
8 0.00059 0 0.05729 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.0023 0.0001 0.02502 0.00343
9 0.00059 0 0.05807 0.0029 0.00174 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.00252 0.0001 0.0264 0.00343
10 0.00157 0 0.05886 0.002923 0.00239 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.00252 0.0001 0.0264 0.00343
11 0.00157 0 0.05866 0.0029 0.00218 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.00275 0.0001 0.0264 0.00343
12 0.00157 0 0.05866 0.0029 0.00261 0 0.05595 0.00629 0.00275 0.0001 0.0264 0.00343
13 0.00191 0 0.04754 0.0029 0.00399 0.00142 0.2381 0.0724 0.00298 0.0001 0.0264 0.00343
FNR
1 0.27869 0.273 0.67274 0.5732 0.00232 0.01302 0.04928 0.00232 0.12085 0.12085 0.15698 0.10507
2 0.11293 0.117 0.4997 0.4086 0.00232 0.00232 0.02929 0.00232 0.04859 0.05233 0.12542 0.06645
3 0.0425 0.029 0.39891 0.3127 0.00232 0.00232 0.00186 0.00139 0.02076 0.03281 0.04028 0.01453
4 0.0425 0.029 0.37948 0.2848 0.00232 0.00232 0.00186 0.00139 0.00249 0.00249 0.03571 0.00249
5 0.04068 0.029 0.33212 0.272 0.00232 0.00232 0.00186 0.00139 0.00249 0.00249 0.03198 0.00208
6 0.03825 0.029 0.29751 0.2568 0.00232 0.00232 0.00139 0.00186 0.00249 0.00249 0.03032 0.00208
7 0.03461 0.029 0.2374 0.2417 0.00232 0.00232 0.00139 0.00139 0.00249 0.00249 0.02865 0.00208
8 0.04311 0.029 0.19672 0.2228 0.00232 0.00232 0.00139 0.00186 0.00249 0.00249 0.02824 0.00208
9 0.04675 0.029 0.20765 0.2095 0.00186 0.00232 0.00139 0.00186 0 0.00249 0.00125 0
10 0.18033 0.029 0.75531 0.316333 0 0.00232 0.00046 0.00093 0 0.00208 0.00166 0
11 0.3303 0.575 0.87553 0.3607 0 0.00232 0.00046 0.00093 0 0.00208 0.00208 0
12 0.89982 0.999 0.94171 0.4074 0 0.00232 0.00046 0.00139 0 0.00208 0.00208 0
13 0.99211 1 0.95993 0.7486 0.00186 0.00232 0.00139 0.00093 0 0.00208 0.00208 0
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Table 12: Detection Results for Masking FDI Attacks in the IEEE 39-bus System.
PAM FVSI ISI
Metrics # of CompromisedPMUs w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM w-DAE DAE LSTM OC-SVM
Accuracy
1 0.738 0.737 0.725 0.833 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.995 0.997 0.872 0.933
2 0.96 0.915 0.785 0.743 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
3 0.963 0.961 0.82 0.828 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
4 0.965 0.964 0.838 0.867 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
5 0.986 0.964 0.876 0.891 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
6 0.988 0.964 0.902 0.896 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
7 0.988 0.964 0.915 0.897 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
8 0.988 0.964 0.91 0.886 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.872 0.933
9 0.987 0.964 0.907 0.876 0.997 0.998 0.852 0.955 0.996 0.997 0.871 0.932
10 0.987 0.964 0.852 0.904 0.998 0.998 0.852 0.954 0.996 0.997 0.865 0.932
11 0.962 0.874 0.782 0.892 0.998 0.998 0.852 0.954 0.98 0.981 0.85 0.919
12 0.801 0.737 0.745 0.845 0.998 0.998 0.852 0.954 0.977 0.973 0.789 0.893
13 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.719 0.62 0.62 0.5 0.579 0.596 0.598 0.479 0.534
F1
1 0.064 0.045 0.101 0.584 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
2 0.921 0.812 0.412 0.174 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
3 0.927 0.921 0.552 0.566 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
4 0.931 0.928 0.613 0.696 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
5 0.973 0.928 0.73 0.763 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
6 0.976 0.928 0.796 0.775 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
7 0.976 0.928 0.829 0.778 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
8 0.976 0.928 0.818 0.75 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.994 0.996 0.862 0.922
9 0.976 0.928 0.81 0.722 0.996 0.998 0.837 0.944 0.995 0.996 0.861 0.921
10 0.976 0.928 0.66 0.798 0.997 0.998 0.837 0.943 0.995 0.996 0.853 0.921
11 0.925 0.695 0.405 0.766 0.997 0.998 0.837 0.943 0.974 0.975 0.835 0.905
12 0.421 0.046 0.222 0.624 0.997 0.998 0.836 0.943 0.971 0.966 0.751 0.871
13 0.01 0 0.14 0.023 0.009 0 0.1 0.016 0.007 0 0.029 0.006
FPR
1 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.2381 0.0724 0.0064 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
2 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.2381 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
3 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
4 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.23867 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
5 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
6 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00399 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
7 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21269 0.11228
8 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23867 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21269 0.11228
9 0.0009 0 0.02742 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23895 0.0724 0.0064 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
10 0.00202 0 0.02944 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23895 0.0724 0.0064 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
11 0.00202 0 0.02944 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23895 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
12 0.00202 0 0.02944 0.02016 0.00371 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
13 0.00202 0 0.02944 0.02016 0.00285 0.00142 0.23838 0.0724 0.00612 0.0036 0.21242 0.11228
FNR
1 0.96661 0.97693 0.94293 0.56466 0.00186 0.00232 0.00093 0.00093 0.00208 0.00208 0.00208 0
2 0.14511 0.31694 0.72131 0.89982 0.00186 0.00232 0.00046 0.00046 0.00208 0.00208 0.00208 0
3 0.13358 0.14572 0.59077 0.58349 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0.00046 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
4 0.12629 0.13418 0.5258 0.43716 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0.00046 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
5 0.04979 0.13418 0.38312 0.34973 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0.00046 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
6 0.04372 0.13418 0.29022 0.33273 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
7 0.04372 0.13418 0.23983 0.32908 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
8 0.04372 0.13418 0.25744 0.36733 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0 0.00208 0.00208 0.00166 0
9 0.04432 0.13479 0.26897 0.40437 0.00232 0.00232 0.00046 0 0.00042 0.00208 0.00374 0.00208
10 0.04129 0.13479 0.46873 0.29994 0.00046 0.00232 0.00093 0.00232 0.00083 0.00249 0.02035 0.00249
11 0.13479 0.46691 0.72617 0.34487 0.00046 0.00232 0.00093 0.00232 0.04153 0.04319 0.05606 0.03447
12 0.73163 0.97632 0.86521 0.52155 0.00046 0.00232 0.00186 0.00232 0.04776 0.06146 0.20764 0.09884
13 0.99514 1 0.91864 0.98786 0.99535 1 0.92701 0.9907 0.99668 1 0.98048 0.99668
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5.4 Result Analysis
From the presented results, we can see that DAE has the best performance across all exper-
iments, followed by w-DAE, then LSTM and OC-SVM. LSTM and OC-SVM performed
similarly in most cases with some instances where LSTM outperformed OC-SVM and
others where OC-SVM outperforming LSTM. In particular, we notice that LSTM’s perfor-
mance slightly deteriorate on the IEEE 39-bus system where it falls below OC-SVM which
was able to scale better on the bigger system.
Additionally, we notice that including time information in the feature vector does not im-
prove the detection results: DAE and w-DAE had almost the same performance, and they
both had better results than LSTM in all test cases.
Furthermore, we see that the detection performance increases when more PMUs are com-
promised. This is especially evident in the 39-bus system where the number of PMUs is
bigger. Such a limited attack will not be capable of showing an effect on the targeted ap-
plication serious enough to illicit a reaction from the controller or that is consistent across
different areas in the grid. The tested methods perform worse on these limited attacks than
more dangerous attacks because the subtle alterations to the small number of measurements
results in a reconstruction error that may not be big enough to cross the threshold in most
instances of the attack. This is caused by the fact that the reconstruction errors of all fea-
tures are summed and averaged which can lead to suppressing errors coming from the small
number of subtle variations.
Moreover, we notice low FPR especially for DAE and w-DAE. Low FPR shows a low
number of false alerts raised. False alerts are a significant problem that cyberattack de-
tection teams face because, when numerous, false alerts can become overwhelming and
time-costly and subsequently they will lower the confidence of the operators in the detec-
tion models. As a result, operators will start to ignore raised alarms which can be very
dangerous in case the alarm is accurate and corresponds to a real cyberattack. Therefore,
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low FPR is a very important indicator of the good performance of the detection model.
On the other hand, we see in attacks on the PAM application that once the attacker has con-
trol of most of the system, the detection performance deteriorates until it reaches almost 0
when all PMUs are compromised. This is due to the fact that increasing the load by 50%
can lead to an increase in PAM indices of some lines. Therefore if the attacker alters most
or all measurements in the system to show an increase in PAM indices, he will be portray-
ing to the controller an operational scenario where there is a 50% increase in some loads,
which is a scenario that is included in the training set. To this point, we also notice sim-
ilar behavior with the masking attacks because in those scenarios, the attacker is altering
the measurements to show the normal behavior of the grid, effectively portraying a normal
scenario that was also included in the training set. This shows that the techniques avoid
over-fitting and are able to generalize. However, we don’t see this pattern of behavior for
attacks on FVSI and ISI because the scenario that shows an instability in these applications
is not included in the training scenarios, thus the models won’t recognize it and will flag it.
Most notably, the detection results are consistent for the 9 and 39-bus systems which attests
for the scalability of the proposed technique, and the robustness of the results. In addition,
we measure the required detection time for each incoming packet and the results show that
it is in the order of milliseconds, varying between 0.06 seconds and 0.15 seconds for the
different models. This shows that the detection process doesn’t cause any significant delay




Smart Grid security is a crucial research topic that is always evolving and attracting more
research effort due to the importance of protecting critical infrastructures against the new
threat of cyberattacks. In this research work, we present a comparative study of data driven
anomaly detection techniques for identifying stealthy FDI attacks in WAMS. We design,
implement, and evaluate a new platform for WAMS security monitoring that utilizes DPI
and anomaly detection methods in order to identify cyberattacks. We formulate the FDI
problem as an anomaly detection problem to account for the sparsity of attack data in real-
istic setups. Furthermore, we focus on linking the attacks to specific WAMS applications
in order to observe the impact such attacks can have on the grid. The features used for
anomaly detection are extracted from WAMS-specific protocols via DPI. We emphasise
on performing the experiments in a realistic environment by incorporating real hardware
in the simulations, and by limiting the number of PMUs in the system. The studied tech-
niques proved to be effective in detecting FDI attacks under different attacker conditions.
Moreover, the techniques demonstrated that they are scalable by exhibiting consistent per-
formance on both the 9-bus and the 39-bus systems. By accomplishing this work, our
research contributions consist of:
116
1. Building a realistic WAMS testbed that utilizes hardware from commercial vendors,
simulates different operational scenarios, and monitors multiple stability indices.
2. Developing FDI attacks that target WAMS applications and showing the impact that
those attacks can have on the grid.
3. Formulating the FDI attack detection problem as an anomaly detection problem in or-
der to account for the lack of FDI attack data found in the real facilities thus aligning
the solution with realistic setups.
4. Testing and comparing the performance and scalability of four anomaly detection
techniques in identifying FDI attacks by analysing DPI-based features.
Our work can be improved in the future from different aspects. First, FNR is signifi-
cantly higher than FPR, this is due to the fact that the attacker modifies the measurements
gradually to achieve the ultimate goal so when the attack is launched there is a phase where
the measurements are being modified but they are still very similar to the normal mea-
surements. Although this slight variation in the measurements is not enough to portray an
instability to the controller, it is nevertheless considered as an attack instance and the pro-
posed algorithms are not able to flag such subtle changes. Further experimentation can help
in resolving this issue and lowering the FNR. Second, supplementing DPI-based features
with other sources of knowledge such as network system management (NSM) information
and device logs can possibly improve the detection performance because it provides a holis-
tic view of the network behavior. For example, in the FDI attack tree presented, the attacker
can either infiltrate the network or take control of the PMU. Including NSM features in the
attack detection model would provide more information on the communication network
such as packet interarrival time and number of opened and closed connections. This infor-
mation can be leveraged to detect rogue devices and MITM setups in the network which are
used to launch FDI attacks. In addition, including device logs can detect when a PMU in the
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field is compromised, physically or via malware, by monitoring the processes running on
the PMU and this could convey to the detection model that the measurements received are
modified at the level of the PMU. Third, combining anomaly detection and classification
can help in identifying the anomalous behavior and eradicating it. The anomaly detection
model would flag any abnormal behavior and pass it to the classification model in order to
determine the exact nature of the attack. Furthermore, this approach can be expanded to dif-
ferentiate between zero-day attacks and known attacks: zero-day attacks would be flagged
by the anomaly detection model but the classification model would not be able to confi-
dently associate it with a know attack, while known attacks would be flagged as anomalous
and classified with high confidence. This would enhance the security of WAMS by provid-
ing the operator with more information regarding the event taking place however it requires
the simulation and collection of numerous attack scenarios. Fourth, combining rule-based
and data-driven anomaly detection to monitor the different protocol frames can enhance the
security of WAMS communications. For example, IEEE C37.118 has four different frames
that are used to establish the connection between the IEDs, set/change the configuration of
the packets, and carry the measurements. In this work we focused on monitoring the data
frames that carry the measurements using data-driven techniques. However, future work
can expand on this effort by monitoring the configuration, command, and header frames us-
ing rule-based anomaly detection, because the behavior of these frames is simpler and the
information they carry can be modeled using rules developed based on the specifications in
the protocol and the sequential behavior of these frames. Fifth, to ensure the safe deploy-
ment of the SG, research effort should focus on monitoring the security of the different SG
domains such as substations, distribution systems, microgirds, etc. The security monitoring
approaches of the different domains would compliment each other and ensure a more se-
cure SG. For example, an attack on the transmission system can be linked to another attack
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on the distribution system launched by the same cyberattackers. By monitoring both sys-
tems, the controller can draw a link between both cyberattacks, increasing the controller’s
awareness of the situation and facilitating the response and recovery process.
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